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I. INTRODUCTION: CRIMINALIZING PURCHASES OF MoRE
THAN ONE HANDGUN EACH MONTH
May a constitutional right be limited by a legislature's determi-
nation of whether, to what extent, or how many times within a given
time period a person has a "need" to exercise that right? Would it be
consistent with the freedom of the press, for instance, to make it a
crime to purchase more than one Bible, or more than one copy of
Marx and Engles' Communist Manifesto, each month? Who, other than
dealers in books, really "needs" more than one such book per month?
Or what if, instead of listing specific titles, a legislature prohibited
purchase of more than one book containing violent themes, or more
than one book advocating civil disobedience, each month?
It has long been recognized that the pen is mightier than the
sword, and that is why burning books was just as popular in Nazi
Germany as was confiscating firearms. American jurisprudence has
surely established that no legislature could, consistent with freedom of
the press, determine that citizens have no "need" to purchase more
than a specified number of books of a given type, no matter how
"subversive," in a specified time period, and make it a crime to do so.
[Vol. 96:1
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In 1993, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a statute
criminalizing the purchase of more than one handgun each month.1
Bills have been introduced in the United States Congress to do the
same,2 and are likely to be introduced in other states, including West
Virginia. The City of Charleston, West Virginia, has passed such an
ordinance.3
The bills of rights of forty-three states and the United States Con-
stitution protect, albeit with different wording, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms free from infringement. 4 The federal Second
Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed."5 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, originally
adopted in 1776, was amended in 1971 to guarantee that "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed .... 6 As
amended in 1986, the West Virginia Bill of Rights includes the fol-
lowing: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense
of self, family, home, and state, and for lawful hunting and recreation-
al use."7
Would or does the criminalization of the purchase of more than
one handgun each month infringe on the right to keep and bear arms?
This is a relatively new query in regard to an issue that traditionally
has asked questions such as whether a prohibition of mere possession
of a firearm by a person infringes on the right to keep arms, or
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:20 (Michie 1993). Virginia was not the first state
to do so: South Carolina enacted such legislation in 1975. Code of Laws of South Caroli-
na § 23-31-140 provides, inter alia, that "no person shall be allowed to purchase more
than one pistol during each thirty-day period," except that "a person whose pistol is stolen
or irretrievably lost and who feels that it is essential that he immediately possess a pistol"
may obtain a police permit to do so.
2. S. 376, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993) and H.R. 544, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
3. CODE OF Crry OF CHARLESTON § 6-106.2.8 (1993).
4. Arms guarantees included in state bills of rights are reprinted in Robert Dowlut,
Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 84-89
(Fall 1989).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
6. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
7. W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 22.
1993]
3
Halbrook: Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep Arms: Reflecti
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
whether a prohibition on carrying a pistol concealed on the person
without a permit infringes on the right to bear arms. All of these
questions require a general exposition of the nature of the right with-
out regard to the specific possible infringement at issue.
Beginning with a description of the Virginia "one-gun-a-month"
statute, the Charleston ordinance, and proposed federal legislation, this
Article then analyzes the nature of the right to keep and bear arms,
with particular reference to Virginia and West Virginia. The perception
of this right in 'Virginia is particularly significant in understanding the
meaning of the federal Second Amendment, for Virginians provided
the primary impetus for adoption of the Second Amendment in the
eighteenth century, and exposited its nature in the nineteenth century in
nationally acclaimed treatises. Analysis of the traditional perception in
Virginia also contributes to the historical understanding of this right in
the constitutional development of that state, which included West Vir-
ginia until the Civil War. This view is the backdrop for the explicit
provisions adopted by Virginia in 1971 and West Virginia in 1986.
The histories of those ratifications, which reveal the meaning of the
respective guarantees, are analyzed separately.
While no court has ever considered the constitutionality of "one-
gun-a-month" legislation, the former Virginia Attorney General ren-
dered an official opinion in 1993 that such leglislation is valid under
the Virginia arms guarantee and the federal Second Amendment. De-
tailed scrutiny of this opinion provides a springboard for further expo-
sition of the nature of the right to keep and bear arms.
No published Virginia decision mentions the right to keep and
bear arms. However, the West Virginia Supreme Court has discussed
the nature of this right in detail. Pertinent cases from Virginia, West
Virginia, and other jurisdictions will be scrutinized.
Advocates for the Virginia statute argued that limiting handgun
purchases to one per month would prevent gun traffickers from New
York from obtaining fictitious driver's licenses in Virginia, purchasing
several handguns, and then reselling them in New York City. They
claimed that in 1993, 41% of the firearms traced by the federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), in New York City originat-
ed in Virginia. However, most "crime guns" are not traced, and most
[Vol. 96:1
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firearms which are traced were never used in a violent crime. Firearms
originating from Virginia may actually account for only 4% of the
firearms seized by New York City police.8 David B. Kopel writes:
The BATF traces only involved about 6-8% of New York City crime
guns. Only 32 guns traced to Virginia (17% of all Virginia traces) were
thought to be involved in violent crimes; far more Virginia "crime" guns
in New York City simply involve non-violent offenses, including technical
violations of the City's draconian laws against simple possession of a
handgun.9
In fact, New York City requires an extensive application process
with the police and as much as a year's wait to approve the purchase
of a handgun. 10 A law-abiding resident of Harlem threatened by gang
members, with no hope of police protection, would not act irrationally
if she purchased a handgun from another state without complying with
legal technicalities. If she defends herself from a rapist, police arrest
her for unlawful possession of the firearm, and a BATF trace indicates
its origin to be Virginia, then her gun will be "seized by police from a
crime scene."
Opponents of the handgun purchase limitation in Virginia argued
that it was necessary only to stop giving out driver's licenses to any-
one who walked into a Department of Motor Vehicles office. Requir-
ing proof of Virginia residency would limit driver's licenses, the usual
identification document for firearm sales, to true Virginia residents."
Moreover, the proposed law could be easily circumvented if the ulti-
mate purchaser uses "straw sales" to make purchases through other
persons.
Proponents justified Virginia's action by pointing out that South
Carolina had already enacted a prohibition on purchase of more than
8. David B. Kopel, Do Federal Gun Traces Accurately Reflect Street Crime?, 5-93
INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER, 4-5 (1993).
9. Id. at 8.
10. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §§ 10-131, 10-301 to -309
(1993); see also LEE THOMAS AND JEFFREY CHAMBERLAIN, GUN CONTROL IN NEW YORK:
A GUIDE TO NEW YORK'S FIREARMS ANDS WEAPONS LAWS (Gunlock Press 1990).
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one handgun per month. Opponents countered that South Carolina has
a drastically higher rate of crime than Virginia, and that this rate in-
creased after enactment of South Carolina's law. This Article is a
constitutional, not a criminological, study. Arguments about causation
and criminal behavior frequently encountered in the "gun control" con-
troversy matter little from a constitutional perspective. For instance, it
could hardly be argued that the Sixth Amendment right to the assis-
tance of counsel in criminal cases would not be violated if crime de-
creased as a result of not allowing an accused person to consult with
counsel more than once each month. A bill of rights guarantee cannot
be disregarded under the guise that its existence contributes to increas-
es in crime or that its absence would make it harder to extract confes-
sions.
Restricting the exercise of a constitutional right to once per month
raises interesting jurisprudential issues not encountered in more draco-
nian prohibitions on the exercise of a constitutional right altogether.
Other than persons who frequent gun shows to enhance collections of
rare firearms, few persons have any wish to purchase more than one
handgun per month, 2 just as few persons may have a desire to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances more than once per
month. The legislation in question tests the outer edges of a constitu-
tional right in a unique manner: to what extent may a legislature deter-
mine that the people do not "need" to exercise a given right more than
a specific number of times in a given temporal period?
As amended by H.B. 1592, effective July 1, 1993, Code of Vir-
ginia section 18.2-308.2:20 provides in part: "Except as provided in
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of this subsection, it shall be unlawful for any
person who is not a licensed firearms dealer to purchase more than
one handgun within any thirty-day period." Violation is punishable as
a Class 1 misdemeanor, i.e., imprisonment of no more than one year
and a fine of no more than $1,000.00.
12. This in itself may be an interesting fact from the viewpoint of penal reform.
What interest does the state have in creating yet another victimless crime and branding yet
more harmless persons as criminals? See Raymond G. Kessler, Enforcement Problems of
Gun Control: A Victimless Crimes Analysis, 16 CRIM. L. BuLL. 131 (1980).
[Vol. 96:1
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The first paragraph of section 18.2-308.2:20(1) describes a special
approval process by the State Police for purchases in excess of one
handgun per thirty-day period:
Purchases in excess of one handgun within a thirty-day period may be
made upon completion of an enhanced background check, as described
herein, by special application to the department of state police listing the
number and type of handguns to be purchased and transferred for lawful
business or personal use, in a collector series, for collections, as a bulk
purchase from estate sales and for similar purposes. Such applications shall
be signed under oath by the applicant on forms provided by the depart-
ment of state police, shall state the purpose for the purchase above the
limit, and shall require satisfactory proof of residency and identity. Such
application shall be in addition to the firearms sales report required by the
bureau of alcohol, tobacco and firearms (ATF). The superintendent of state
police shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to the administrative process
act (§ 9-6.14:1 et seq.), for the implementation of an application process
for purchases of handguns above the limit. 3
Further, subdivision 2 of subsection 0 provides an additional
exception to the prohibition as follows:
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to: ...
f. A person whose handgun is stolen or irretrievably lost who deems
it essential that such handgun be replaced immediately. Such person may
purchase another handgun, even if the person has previously purchased a
handgun within a thirty-day period, provided (I) the person provides the
firearms dealer with a copy of the official police report or a summary
thereof, on forms provided by the department of state police, from the
law-enforcement agency that took the report of the lost or stolen hand-
gun .... The firearms dealer shall attach a copy of the official police
report or summary thereof to the original copy of the Virginia firearms
13. The second paragraph sets forth procedures for purchases from a dealer. It pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Upon being satisfied that these requirements have been met, the department
of state police shall forthwith issue to the applicant a nontransferable certificate
which shall be valid for seven days from the date of issue. The certificate shall
be surrendered to the dealer by the prospective purchaser prior to the consumma-
tion of such sale and shall be kept on file at the dealer's place of business for
inspection as provided in subsection c of § 54.1-4201 for a period of not less
than two years.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:20(1) (Michie 1993).
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transaction report completed for the transaction and retain it for the period
prescribed by the department of state police.
The Handgun Control Act enacted in 1993 by Charleston, West
Virginia, is a direct registration system. Under that ordinance, "no
person or dealer shall sell any handgun to any other person without
first obtaining . . . a registration form" containing information about
the purchaser. 14 The purchaser must certify that the handgun is "not
for resale within a thirty-day period" and that "the purchaser has not
purchased any other handgun within the thirty-day period" before the
date on the registration form. 5 A copy of the form is filed with the
police.6
"No person or dealer shall knowingly sell any handgun to any
other person (i) who has acquired a handgun within the previous 30
days," and "no person shall purchase a handgun (i) if such person has
acquired a handgun within the previous thirty (30) days .... 2P"7 Vio-
lation is a misdemeanor.' 8
The constitutional right to keep arms is not the only obstacle to
the validity of this ordinance. An exception provides: "The Chief of
Police may authorize the purchase of three (3) additional handguns in
a 30-day period by written authorization . . .. "" This is a textbook
case of standandless police discretion which the Council should have
recognized as a due process violation.20 Moreover, statutory preemp-
tion exists in West Virginia: "neither a municipality nor the governing
body of any municipality shall have the power to limit the right of
any person to own any revolver, pistol, rifle or shotgun .... ""
14. Bill No. 4982, passed by Council on July 19, 1993, and codified as CODE OF
CITY OF CHARLESTON § 6-106.2.5(a) (1993).
15. Id.
16. Id. at § 6-106.2.7.
17. Id. at § 6-106.2.8.
18. Id. at § 6-106.2.11.
19. CODE OF CITY OF CHARLESTON § 6-106.2.10(b) (1993).
20. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366-70 (1886); Brevard County v.
Bagwell, 388 So. 2d 6545, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
21. W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5a (1993).
[Vol. 96:1
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The Multiple Handgun Transfer Prohibition Act of 1993 introduced
in the United States Congress, Senate Bill No. 376 (Lautenberg) and
House Bill No. 544 (Torricelli), would create a new subsection in the
Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), making it unlawful for a feder-
ally-licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer 22 to transfer two or
more handguns to a nonlicensed individual in any 30-day period, or to
transfer a handgun to an individual who has already received a hand-
gun within 30 days.23 Similarly, it would be unlawful for a person
who is not a licensee to receive two or more handguns during any 30
day period.
Transactions between nonlicensees, or between a licensed collec-
tor24 and a nonlicensee, would not be regulated by the above pro-
posed statute. The Gun Control Act does not generally regulate intra-
state transactions between nonlicensees.2
The bills would require the licensee, before transferring a handgun
to an individual, to obtain a statement from the individual containing
his or her name, address, and birthdate from a valid identification
document containing the person's photograph, and a statement that the
person is not a convicted felon or otherwise prohibited from receipt of
a firearm by federal law.26 The licensee must verify the identity of
the person by examining the identification document. Within one day
after the individual furnishes the statement, the licensee must provide a
copy of the statement to the chief law enforcement officer of the
buyer's place of residence.
22. A federal license is required to engage in the business of importing, manufactur-
ing, or dealing in firearms. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a) (1993).
23. A "handgun" is defined as a firearm with a short stock designed to be held and
fired by a single hand, or any combination of parts from which a handgun can be assem-
bled.
24. A collector's license allows one to engage in interstate transactions in curio and
relic firearms. 18 U.S.C. §§ 927(a)(2), 923(b) (1993).
25. Transactions between nonlicensees who reside in different states are prohibited. 18
U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (1993).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (n) prohibit receipt of firearms by persons indicted for
or convicted of felonies, and persons who are mental defectives, fugitives, unlawful drug
users or addicts, illegal aliens, and certain others.
19931
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None of the above requirements will apply if the individual pres-
ents to the transferor a statement issued by the chief law enforcement
officer within the previous ten days stating that the person requires a
handgun because of a threat to the life of a person or one's household.
However, that provision "shall not be interpreted to require any action
by a chief law enforcement officer which is not otherwise required.
27
Thus, the officer has no duty to investigate or even consider making
such a statement.
If the officer notifies the licensee that a purchase was not legally
made by an eligible purchaser, the licensee must immediately inform
the chief law enforcement officer of the licensee's place of business
and of the transferee's residence. The licensee must also communicate
to the chief law enforcement officer all information the transferor has
about the transfer and the transferee.
Both the transferor and the chief law enforcement officer "shall
retain" the statement of the transferee, which includes personal infor-
mation. The officer "shall retain the copy for at least 30 days . .. ."
Since no duty exists ever to destroy the record, this allows a system
of registration of firearms owners. Moreover, no constitutional authori-
ty exists for a federal statute to impose this duty on law enforcement
officers, who are employed by States and subdivisions thereof.
28
A knowing violation of section 922(s) would subject one to a
$5,000 fine, one year imprisonment, or both. Does a dealer who
"knowingly" sells a handgun to a person violate this law even if he
27. H.R. 544, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
28. As long ago as Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1861), the
Court stated that "the federal government, under the constitution, has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." And as
recently as New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the Court repeated:
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply
does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Consti-
tution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-
empt contrary state regulation. Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to
cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript State
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lacks knowledge that the person purchased a handgun elsewhere within
thirty days? The bill, as written, is unclear.
To what extent are the above pieces of legislation consistent with
the right to keep arms? The first step is to consider the origins of this
right in American constitutionalism.
II. THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS AS A PREEXISTING RIGHT:
THE SECOND AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
A. The Virginia Declaration of Rights
Virginia was the first of all the colonies to adopt a bill of rights,
and it became the prototype for those of other colonies. The Virginia
Declaration of Rights, adopted in convention on June 12, 1776, includ-
ed the following interconnected propositions:
I. That all Men are by Nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent Rights ... ; namely, the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty,
with the Means of... pursuing and obtaining... Safety.
II. That all Power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the
People ....
XIII. That a well regulated Militia, composed of the Body of the
People, trained to Arms, is the proper, natural, and safe Defense of a free
State; that standing Armies, in Time of Peace, should be avoided, as dan-
gerous to Liberty.
The author of the Declaration was George Mason, who had em-
ployed similar phraseology during the previous two years in his writ-
ings on the Fairfax Independent Militia Company. As Mason insisted
in 1775, "a well regulated Militia, composed of the Gentlemen, Free-
holders, and other Freemen," would preserve liberty, and thus "we do
each of us, for ourselves respectively, promise and engage to keep a
good Fire-lock .... "29 In the same year, comp..rable language was
proposed by Patrick Henry and adopted by the Virginia convention:
"That a well regulated Militia, composed of Gentlemen and Yeomen,
29. 1 GEORGE MASON, THE PAPERS OF 215-16 (Rutland ed. 1970) [hereinafter MA-
SON].
11
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is the natural Strength, and only Security, of a free Govern-
ment .... 30
Pursuant to its resolution, the 1775 convention appointed Patrick
Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee, and others to a commit-
tee to plan the "embodying, arming, and disciplining such a Number
of Men as may be sufficient for that purpose.",3' The convention also
recommended "that every Man be provided with a good Rifle" and
"that every Horseman be provided . . . with Pistols and Holsters, a
Carbine, or other Firelock .... ,,3' This background clarifies the
meaning of the Declaration of Rights adopted a year later. Every free-
man would have "the means" of obtaining "safety," "all power" would
remain in "the people," and "a free state" would be defended where
the citizens kept and trained with "arms" (rifles, firelocks, carbines,
and pistols) and associated themselves into "militia., 33
Having adopted the Declaration of Rights, the 1776 convention
considered various proposals for a constitution. Thomas Jeffer-
son-himself a gun collector who would, on at least one occasion,
purchase two pistols at a time34-prepared a draft which included a
bill of rights which stated: "All persons shall have full & free liberty
of. religious opinion .... No freeman shall ever be debarred the use
of arms .... There shall be no standing army but in time of...
actual war. Printing presses shall be free . . .,35
On June 29, 1776, the Virginia convention adopted a constitution.
The preface incorporated Jefferson's strictures against George III,
which found their way into the Declaration of Independence. The text
was based on proposals submitted by George Mason and others.36 It
contained no additional bill of rights since the Declaration of Rights
30. JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION HELD AT RICHMOND 10 (1775).
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 17.
33. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES 100-02 (1776).
34. Ashley Halsey and John Snyder, Jefferson's Beloved Guns, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN
17, 20 (Nov. 1969) (quoting Jefferson's account book entry of March 30, 1786:
"P[ai]d . . . for p[ai]r pocket pistols, one pound 18 shillings").
35. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF 344 (Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON].
36. Id. at 377.
[Vol. 96:1
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had been adopted just over two weeks before. Jefferson's postulate that
"no freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms" had been ex-
pressed in other words in that declaration--"the Body of the People,
trained to Arms"-and indeed was fundamental to the American world
view at that time.
Encouraged by Virginia's declaration, other states adopted bills of
rights, embellishing or expanding on the freedoms listed by George
Mason. The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 stated "that
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
the state; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, they ought not to be kept up ....,3 North Carolina's Dec-
laration of Rights, drafted during the same year, asserted "that the
people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State"3 8-a
subtle way of claiming not only the individual right to personal de-
fense but also the right to overthrow the established (British) govern-
ment by protecting the state against it. The Vermont Declaration of
Rights of 1777 maintained "that the people have a right to bear arms
for the defence of themselves and the State. 39
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 provided that
"the people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common de-
fence., 40 The phrase "common defence" precluded any construction
that arms could be used only for individual self-defense but not for
common defense against governmental despotism.
B. The Adoption of the Second Amendment
The Revolution was won, and in 1787 came the constitutional
convention which met at Philadelphia. What became the federal Con-
stitution was proposed without a bill of rights, leading to great contro-
versy in the state ratification conventions, particularly that of Virginia.
37. PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776).
38. N.C. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. XVII (1776).
39. VT. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XV (1777).
40. MASS. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1780).
1993]
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Before the Virginia ratification convention met, at least three ver-
sions of arms guarantees were proposed in connection with other state
conventions. The majority of the Pennsylvania convention refused to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which it ratified on December
12, 1787. However, the "Dissent of the Minority of the Convention"
demanded a declaration of rights, including the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from
individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be kept
under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil powers.41.
Samuel Adams, the most prolific proponent of the individual right
to keep and bear arms in the pre-Revolutionary era,42 introduced the
following amendment in the Massachusetts convention:
And that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress to
infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of conscience; or to
prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from
keeping their own arms; or to raise standing armies, unless when necessary
for the defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or
to prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner,
the federal legislature, for a redress of grievances; or to subject the people
to unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, papers or posses-
sions.43
When it ratified the Constitution on June 21, 1788, the New
Hampshire convention became the first in which a majority voted to
recommend a bill of rights, albeit a brief one. The recommended
amendments concerning individual rights, which would be reflected in
the First, Second, and Third Amendments, were as follows:
41. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 623-24
(Merrill Jensen ed. 1976).
42. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1-7 (1989).
43. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788 at 86-87, 266 (Boston, Bradford K. Peirce &
Charles Hale eds. 1856).
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X. That no standing army shall be kept up in time of peace, unless
with the consent of three fourths of the members of each branch of Con-
gress; nor shall soldiers, in a time of peace, be quartered upon private
houses, without the consent of the owners.
XI. Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the
rights of conscience.
XII. Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or
have been in actual rebellion."
Virginia's federalists fervently denied any danger from the proposed
general government, in part because the people were armed. In The
Federalist No. 46, James Madison contended that "the ultimate authori-
ty ... resides in the people alone." To a regular army of the United
States government "would be opposed a militia amounting to near half
a million citizens with arms in their hands." Alluding to "the advan-
tage of being armed, which the 'Americans possess over the people of
almost every other nation,"45 Madison continued: "Notwithstanding
the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which
are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments
are afraid to trust the people with arms. 46
Alexander White, another Virginian who would be elected to that
state's convention, published a strong reply to the Pennsylvania "Dis-
sent" as follows:
There are other things so clearly out of the power of Congress, that the
bare recital of them is sufficient, I mean the "rights of conscience, or
religious liberty-the rights of bearing arms for defence, or for killing
game-the liberty of fowling, hunting and fishing ... ... These things
seem to have been inserted among their objections, merely to induce the
ignorant to believe that Congress would have a power over such objects
and to infer from their being refused a place in the Constitution, their
intention to exercise that power to the oppression of the people.47
44. 1 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (J. B. LippinCott Company 1836)
[hereinafter ELLIOT].
45. 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 492
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 1984).
46. Id. at 493.
47. 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 404
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1988),
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Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia political leader since
colonial times, wanted no constitution without a bill of rights. In a
series of Letters from the Federal Farmer,48 Lee expressed fear that
Congress would establish a "select militia" apart from the people that
would be used as an instrument of domination by the federal govern-
ment:
But, say gentlemen, the general militia are for the most part employed at
home in their private concerns, cannot well be called out, or be depended
upon; that we must have a select militia; that is, as I understand it, partic-
ular corps or bodies of young men, and of men who have but little to do
at home, particularly armed and disciplined in some measure, at the public
expense, and always ready to take the field. These corps, not much unlike
regular troops, will ever produce an inattention to the general militia; and
the consequence has ever been, and always must be, that the substantial
men, having families and property, will generally be without arms, without
knowing the use of them, and defenseless; whereas, to preserve liberty, it
is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be
taught alike, especially when young, how to use them; nor does it follow
from this, that all promiscuously must go into actual service on every
occasion. The mind that aims at a select militia, must be influenced by a
truly anti-republican principle; and when we see many men disposed to
practice upon it, whenever they can prevail, no wonder true republicans are
for carefully guarding against it.49
Virginians at the ratification convention of 1788 demanded that the
rights to speak, assemble, and keep arms be expressly recognized in
the proposed federal compact. "The great object is, that every man be
armed," contended Patrick Henry. 50 George Mason warned against
"disarm[ing] the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to
enslave them . . . .5' Zachriah Johnson defended the proposed fed-
eral constitution: "The people are not to be disarmed of their weap-
ons."
52
48. RICHARD HENRY LEE, AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 170 (Quadrangle Books 1962) (1788).
49. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
50. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 386.
51. Id. at 380.
52. Id. at 646.
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Concerning the militia, George Mason asked "who are the militia,
if they be not the people of this country ... ? I ask, Who are the
militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public
officers."53
Federalists and antifederalists reached a compromise to ratify the
Constitution and at the same time to propose a bill of rights. The
recommended bill of rights asserting "the essential and unalienable
rights of the people" 54 included the following:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing armies, in time of
peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far
as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that,
in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and gov-
erned by, the civil power.'5
George Mason, the draftsman, simply added the first clause-the right
to keep and bear arms-to the rest of the provision he had drafted for
the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.56
The Virginia convention recommended an entirely different set of
amendments to the text of the Constitution, including the provision:
"That each state respectively shall have the power to provide for orga-
nizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress
shall omit or neglect to provide for the same., 57 This language did
not appear in the draft declaration Mason had authored before the con-
vention. This and other amendments clarifying the federal-state rela-
tionship would later fail in Congress altogether. Even so, the essence
of some of these proposals would be ratified in the more general
Tenth Amendment. However, the significance of its proposal is clear:
when the framers wished to protect individual rights, such as keeping
and bearing arms, they referred to "the right of the people." When
53. Id. at 425-26.
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id. at 659.
56. 3 MASON, supra note 29, at 1068-71.
57. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 660.
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referring to state powers, such as the power to maintain a militia, they
stated just that-"each state respectively shall have the power . . . "
On June 8, 1789, in the United States House of Representatives,
James Madison proposed his long-awaited bill of rights. In his notes
for a speech introducing what became the Bill of Rights, Madison
wrote: "They [the proposed amendments] relate first to private
rights-fallacy on both sides-espec[iall]y as to English Decl[aratio]n. of
Rights-1. mere act of parl[iamen]t. 2. no freedom of
press-Conscience . . . attainders-arms to protest[an]ts." 58
Thus, Madison stated that the rights he would propose, such as
freedom of the press and keeping and bearing arms, were "private
rights." The "fallacy" as to the English Declaration of Rights was that
it was a "mere act of Parliament" which Parliament itself could repeal;
by contrast, the American bill of rights would not, as part of the Con-
stitution, be subject to repeal by Congress. Moreover, the English
Declaration either omitted or unreasonably limited fundamental rights.
Freedom of the press was not recognized at all, and the right to keep
and bear arms was -limited to Protestants and further limited by class:
"That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their
Defence suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by Law." 59
Madison's proposed bill of rights as introduced in the Congress
contained both philosophical declarations and substantive restrictions.
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak,"
and a free press, "as one of the great bulwarks of liberty," would be
inviolable. 6° "The people shall not be restrained from peaceably as-
sembling and consulting for their common good," and petitioning the
legislature for redress of grievances. 61 The next guarantee referred to
the same entity with rights--"the people"--and interposed a philosoph-
58. JOHN MADISON, THE PAPERS OF, Notes for Speech in Congress, 193-94 (Rutland
ed. 1979) [hereinafter MADISON].
59. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2,
c.2 (1689). See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (Harvard Univ. Press 1990).
60. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 10 (Charlene




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/4
RATIONING FIREARMS PURCHASES
ical declaration between two restrictions: "The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well
regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no per-
son religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to ren-
der military service in person." 62
This provision, which became the Second Amendment, began with
a substantive guarantee in the nature of a command that the individual
right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Just as "keeping"
arms referred to possession of arms by an individual, such as in the
home, the terms "bear arms" meant simply to carry arms. Previously,
Madison had sponsored a bill in the Virginia legislature under which a
person who hunted deer illegally would be on probation for a year and
could not "bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst per-
forming military duty ....,63 The violator could bear a pistol, but
not a shoulder arm, except for militia duty.
After the above command that the right shall not be infringed,
Madison's proposal made the philosophical declaration that a well
armed and regulated militia is the best security of a free country. This
declaration did not limit the right, but gave the chief political reason
for guaranteeing the right against governmental infringement. Keeping
and bearing arms would be protected for all lawful purposes.
Ten days after the Bill of Rights was proposed in the House,
Tench Coxe published his "Remarks on the First Part of the
Amendments to the Federal Constitution," under the pen name "A
Pennsylvanian," in the Philadelphia Federal Gazette.'6 Probably the
most complete exposition of the Bill of Rights to be published during
its ratification period, the "Remarks" included the following: "[A]s
civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may
attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occa-
sionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the
injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next
62. Id.
63. Bill for Preservation of Deer (1785), in 2 JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 443-44.
64. FEDERAL GAZmEIE, June 18, 1789, at 2, col. 1. Madison's proposals had been
published two days before in the same paper. FEDERAL GAZETrE, June 16, 1789, at 2, col.
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article in their right to keep and bear their private arms." In short,
what is now the Second Amendment was designed to guarantee the
right of the people to have "their private arms" to prevent tyranny and
to overpower an abusive standing army or select militia.
Coxe sent a copy of his article to Madison along with a letter of
the same date. Madison endorsed Coxe's analysis-including that the
amendment protected the possession and use of "private arms"-with
the comment that ratification of the amendments "will however be
greatly favored by explanatory strictures of a healing tendency, and is
therefore already indebted to the co-operation of your pen."65 It was
only a matter of time before the Bill of Rights would become part of
the Constitution.
Forty years later, Madison's career came full circle as he served
as a delegate to the Virginia constitutional convention of 1829. Re-
flecting on the danger to a republic of limited suffrage as had been
advocated at the convention, Madison expressed the world view of the
generation that produced the Revolution and the Bill of Rights as
follows: "A Government resting on a minority, is an aristocracy not a
Republic, and could not be safe with a numerical physical force
against it, without a standing Army, an enslaved press, and a disarmed
populace.' 6
6
C. St. George Tucker, The American Blackstone
Decades after its publication in 1803, St. George Tucker's edition
of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries was described as "a work
of great ability, and necessary to every student and practitioner of law
in Virginia." 67 Having taught the common law for some time at the
College of William and Mary, that same year Tucker was appointed
judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and later served on the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.6 8
65. Madison to Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 12 MADISON supra note 58, at 257.
66. James Madison's Autobiography, 2 WM. & MARY Q. 191, 208 (1945).
67. Daniel Call, Biography of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) xxvi, xxviii (1827).
68. Id. See also Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker. The American Blackstone,
32 VA. BAR NEWS 45 (Feb. 1984).
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United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, joined by Justice
William 0. Douglas, would praise Tucker as expressing "the general
view held when the First Amendment was adopted and ever since." 69
"St. George Tucker, a distinguished Virginia jurist, took part in the
Annapolis Convention of 1786, sat on both state and federal courts,
and was widely known for his writings on judicial and constitutional
subjects."7
The lengthy appendix by Tucker in his edition of Blackstone has
been characterized as "the first disquisition upon the character and
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, as well as upon its origin
and true nature."7 It includes a clause-by-clause legal commentary on
the United States Constitution, and was for years a textbook in Virgin-
ia and other states in the early republic.72 Tucker considered the bill
of rights to be a message for every citizen:
A bill of rights may be considered, not only as intended to give law, and
assign limits to a government about to be established, but as giving infor-
mation to the people. By reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws,
every man of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his own
rights, and know when they are violated .... ."
Judge Tucker adhered to the then-incipient view that the courts are
duty bound to declare statutes contrary to the constitution as void.
Tucker opined that the Virginia Constitution of 1776, being the sov-
ereign act of the people and hence the supreme law, "is a rule to all
departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to the legis-
69. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964) (Black, J., concur-
ring).
70. Id. at 296 n.2. A colonel during the Revolution, St. George Tucker's "most bril-
liant exploit was his undertaking, at the instance of Governor Patrick Henry, an expedition
to the West Indies, taking down indigo and bringing back much needed arms and ammuni-
tion." Hon. A.M. Dobie, Federal District Judges in Virginia Before the Civil War, 12
F.R.D. 451, 459 (4th Cir. 1951). Tucker's edition of Blackstone was "unquestionably one
of the most important law-books of its day .... " Id. at 460.
71. St. George Tucker, The Judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, I
VA. L. REG. 789, 794 (1896).
72. Id. at 793.
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lature . . . . 7 And in his appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries,
Tucker elaborated as follows:
If, for example, a law be passed by congress, prohibiting the free exercise
of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions of a man's own con-
science; or abridging the freedom of speech, of the press; or the right of
the people to assemble peaceably, or to keep and bear arms; it would, in
any of these cases, be the province of the judiciary to pronounce whether
any such act were constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit the accused
from any penalty which might be annexed to the breach of such unconsti-
tutional act . . . . The judiciary, therefore, is that department of the gov-
ernment to whom the protection of the rights of the individual is by the
constitution especially confided, interposing its shield between him and the
sword of usurped authority, the darts of oppression, and the shafts of
faction and violence.75
The above doctrine would be adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.76
Blackstone himself examined the right to have arms as one of "the
rights of persons." In referring to "the principal absolute rights which
appertain to every Englishman," Blackstone cautioned:
But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by
the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other meth-
od to secure their actual enjoyment. It has, therefore, established certain
other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as
outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and
primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private proper-
ty77
Blackstone then discussed these "auxiliary subordinate rights," includ-
ing the right to petition the government, as being among the methods
of securing, protecting, and maintaining inviolate the "primary rights of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property." Blackstone
explained about one such right:
74. Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 20, 79 (1793).
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 357.
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
77. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 140-41.
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The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subjects, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition
and degree, and such as are allowed by law . . . It is indeed, a public
allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient
to restrain the violence of oppression.
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently
termed, the liberties of Englishmen .... To vindicate these rights, when
actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are entitled, in the
first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in the
courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for
redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defense."
However, comparing the English Declaration of Rights to the
federal Second Amendment, St. George Tucker wrote: "The right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed ... and this
without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case
in the British government . . . ."" Tucker further distinguished the
English Declaration from the Second Amendment:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . . The
right of self-defense is the first law of nature; in most governments it has
been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits
possible. Whenever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bears arms is, under any color or pretext whatsoever,
prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.
In England, the people have been disarmed, generally under the specious
pretext of preserving the game; a never-failing lure to bring over the land-
ed aristocracy to support any measure under that mask, though calculated
for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first
view to counteract this policy; but their right of bearing arms is confined
to protestants, and the words "suitable to their condition or degree" have
been interpreted to authorize the prohibition of keeping a gun or other
engine for the destruction of game, by any farmer, or inferior tradesman,
or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five
hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty."
78. Id. at 143-44.
79. Id. at 143 n.40.
80. Id., App., at 300. While Tucker's criticism reflects American rejection of British
practices, the courts interpreted the game laws as not prohibiting a gun in the house as
long as not used by an unqualified person for hunting. See, e.g., Rex v. Gardner, 87 Eng.
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Blackstone himself wrote of the tradition of European kingdoms
"to keep the rustici or natives of the county ...in as low a condition
as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms., 81 As
noted, this was done in part under the pretence of preserving game.
Tucker commented further:
The bill of rights, 1 W. and M., says Mr. Blackstone, (Vol. 1. p.
143,) secures to the subjects of England the right of having arms for their
defense, suitable to their condition and degree. In the construction of these
game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is not qualified accord-
ing to law to kill game, hath any right to keep a gun in his house. Now,
as no person, (except the game-keeper of a lord or lady of a manor) is
admitted to be qualified to kill game, unless he has 1001. per annum, &c.
it follows that no others can keep a gun for their defence; so that the
whole nation are completely disarmed, and left at the mercy of the govern-
ment, under the pretext of preserving the breed of hares and partridges, for
the exclusive use of the independent country gentlemen. In America we
may reasonably hope that the people will never cease to regard the right
of keeping and bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty.82
A great deal of antislavery sentiment existed at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution, and soon thereafter, St. George Tucker
published A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual
Abolition of it, in the State of Virginia (1796), which Tucker reprinted
in his edition of Blackstone. Early in his work, Tucker noted that "free
Negroes and mulattoes, whose civil incapacities are almost as numer-
ous as the civil rights of our free citizens," were thereby relegated to a
state of "civil slavery. 83 Despite their military assistance in the Rev-
olution, and their present enrollment "in the lists of those that bear
arms," under existing Virginia law "all but housekeepers, and persons
residing upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying
any gun, powder, shot, club, or other weapon offensive or defensive.
Rep. 1240 (K.B. 1739). Of course, local sherrifs and prosecutors may have bullied com-
moners who could not afford counsel to invoke such precedents.
81. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 413.
82. Id. at 414 n.3.
83. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY 19 (Philadelphia 1796)
[hereinafter TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY].
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Resistance to a white person ... is punishable by whipping."" Of
course, the same disabilities applied to those subjected to "domestic
slavery, ' 5 that is, to chattel slaves.
Civil slavery and domestic slavery, -Tucker noted, were in blatant
contradiction to section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, which held
"that all men are by nature equally fr&e and independent .... 6 The
"civil rights" of free persons included "the right of personal securi-
ty,' 87 which Tucker elsewhere pointed out included keeping and bear-
ing arms.88 These civil rights had been denied to slaves by the Vir-
ginia act of 1680, which
prohibited slaves from carrying any club, staff, gun, sword, or other weap-
on, offensive or defensive. This was afterwards extended to all Negroes,
mulattoes and Indians whatsoever, with a few exceptions in favor of
housekeepers, residents on a frontier plantation, and such as were enlisted
in the militia.
8 9
From this melancholy review it will appear that ... even the right of
personal security, has been, at times, either wholly annihilated or reduced
to a shadow . ... 90
Of course, the deprivation of arms was one of a bundle of disabil-
ities bolstering the peculiar institution of slavery. "To go abroad with-
out a written permission; to keep or carry a gun, or other weapon; to
utter any seditious speech; to be present at any unlawful assembly of
slaves; to lift the hand in opposition to a white person, unless wanton-
ly assaulted, are all offences punishable by whipping.
91
The most perplexing problem for the moderate abolitionist Tucker
concerned the mode and consequences of manumission. Under the
ancient law of William the Conqueror, English villeins were eman-
84. Id. at 20.
85. Id. at 22.
86. Id. at 30, 50.
87. Id. at 49.
88. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 144.
89. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY supra note 83, at 55. This act was reenact-
ed in 1705 and 1792.
90. Id. at 57.
91. Id. at 65.
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cipated as follows: "If any person is willing to enfranchise his slave,
let him . . deliver him free arms, to wit, a lance and a sword; there-
upon he is a free man." 92 This was not in accord with American
practice: "In England, the presenting the villein with free anns, seems
to have been the symbol of his restoration to all the rights which a
feudatory was entitled to. With us, we have seen that emancipation
does not confer the rights of citizenship on the person emancipat-
ed . . . . ,9
Specifically, Tucker prescribed that domestic slaves be promoted
to a status of what he had earlier defined as "civil slavery." In a de-
tailed plan, he wrote:
Let no Negroe or mulattoe be capable of taking, holding, or exercis-
ing, any public office, freehold, franchise or privilege .... Nor of keep-
ing, or bearing arms, unless authorized so to do by some act of the gener-
al assembly, whose duration shall be limited to three years.94
By denying them the most valuable privileges which civil government
affords, I wished to render it their inclination and their interest to seek
those privileges in some other climate .... [B]y disarming them, we may
calm our apprehensions of their resentments arising from past suffer-
ings ...."
Henry St. George Tucker, son of St. George Tucker and president
of the Virginia Supreme Court, wrote his own expanded commentaries
on Blackstone, whose principles were applied to the American experi-
ence. This work was described as "the vade mecum of the bar of
Virginia" and as follows: "It was recognized by the bar of Virginia,
and in many of the Southern States, as the most valuable text-book for
92. Id. at 70-71.
93. Id. at 75.
94. Id. at 93. 1 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRnT OF THE LAWS 243-44 (1899) warned of the
"danger from the multitude of slaves" and "the danger of arming slaves . . .in republics."
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 417 states that slaves, excluded from liberty, envy and
hate the rest of the community, and thus warned "not to intrust those slaves with arms;
who will then find themselves an overmatch for the freemen."
95. TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supra note 83, at 94-95.
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students and lawyers then in existence."96 Henry Tucker wrote con-
cerning "the principal absolute rights of individuals":
To secure their enjoyment, however, certain protections or barriers
have been erected which serve to maintain inviolate the three primary
rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. These
may in America be said to be:
1. The bill of rights and written constitutions ....
2. The right of bearing arms-which with us is not limited and re-
strained by an arbitrary system of game laws as in England; but is practi-
cally enjoyed by every citizen, and is among his most valuable privileges,
since it furnishes the means of resisting as a freeman ought, the inroads of
usurpation.
3. The right of applying to the courts of justice for the redress of
injuries. 97
When Tucker wrote the above, the only "gun-control" law on the
books required slaves, free negroes and mulattoes, to have a permit to
carry a weapon, without which punishment and forfeiture of the weap-
on were mandated. 9 In 1838, the first such law applicable to whites
96. St. George Tucker, The Judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1
VA. L. REG. 789, 807 (1896).
97. 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 43
(1831). And see H. TUCKER, LECrURES ON GOVERNMENT 37 (1844) (as sovereigns, the
people have the right "to reform, to alter or abolish [the government], at their discretion.").
In A FEW LECTURES ON NATURAL LAw 95 (1844), Henry Tucker wrote:
Now the natural right of self defence is nothing more than the liberty which the
law of nature allows us of defending ourselves from an attack which is made
upon our persons or of taking such measures as may guard against any injuries
we are likely to suffer from another ....
... [A]s the law of nature allows us to defend ourselves, and imposes no limit
upon the right, the only limit we can impose is the necessity of the case. What-
ever means are necessary must be lawful; for the rule is general, that where a
right is absolutely given, the means of exercising it must also follow.
And see id. at 10-11, 96-99.
98. The Code of Virginia, 1819, provided in pertinent part in Chapter III:
§ 7. No Negro or mulatto slave whatsoever shall keep or carry any gun,
powder, shot, club or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive . . . [under
penalty of up to thirty-nine lashes]: Provided, that slaves living at any frontier
plantation, may be permitted to keep and use guns, powder, shot, and weapons,
offensive or defensive, by license from a justice of the peace of the county
wherein such plantation lies . ...
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was passed. "If a free person, habitually, carry about -his person hid
from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of
the like kind, he shall be fined fifty dollars. The informer shall have
one half of such fine."99 Law enforcement officers at that time had
no special privileges, and the Virginia high court affirmed the convic-
tion under the statute of a constable who "drew out a pistol and dirk"
against one merely to levy an execution.1°°
D. Protecting the Right of Freedmen to Have Arms: Virginia and
the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
the product of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which held ex-
tensive hearings in the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress.
These 1866 hearings would document the violation of the freedmen's
rights, including the right to keep and bear arms, thereby showing the
need for constitutional protection.
Senator Jacob Howard conducted a great deal, perhaps most, of
the examination of witnesses at the hearings. Some of these witnesses
testified concerning the mistreatment of blacks in Virginia. John
Hawkshurst, a federal tax commissioner from Fairfax County, Virginia,
responded to a question by Senator Howard concerning the disposition
of whites toward freedmen as follows:
The corporate authorities of Alexandria refused to grant them licenses to
do business, the law of the State not allowing it; and attempts were made
§ 8. No free negro or mulatto, shall be suffered to keep or carry any fire-
lock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead, without first ob-
taining a license from the court of the county or corporation in which he resides,
which license may, at any time, be withdrawn by an order of such court.
99. VA. CODE, as amended, tit. 54, ch. 196, § 7 (1849). By that time permits were
no longer available for blacks. Tit. 54, ch. 200, § 8 simply provided: "A negro shall be
punished with stripes . . . [i]f he keep or carry firearms, sword or other weapon, or balls
or ammunition; besides forfeiting to the state, any such articles in his possession ....
While the same reappears in VA. CODE, tit. 54, ch. 200, § 11 (1860), the prohibition
against blacks bearing arms was partially repealed to allow for black Confederate soldiers.
Act of March 6, 1865, 46 WAR OF REBiELLION, Ser. I., pt. 3, p. 1315 (1894).
100. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 597, 598 (1850).
[Vol. 96:1
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/4
RATIONING FIREARMS PURCHASES
in that city to enforce the old law against them in respect to whipping and
carrying fire-arms, nearly or quite up to the time of the establishment of
the Freedmen's Bureau in that city.''
Testimony centered on the need for freedmen and others to be
armed for self defense against violent attack. William J. Dews, a mu-
sic professor, noted an incident at Mount Sydney, Virginia, where "two
Union men were attacked . . . .But they drew their revolvers and held
their assailants at bay. '' 102 The professor himself was armed for pro-
tection. °3
Senator Howard questioned Colonel Orlando Brown, an assistant
commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau at Richmond, Virginia. If the
Bureau were to be removed, asked Howard, what would be the result
of the increased violence toward blacks? The following exchange took
place:
Answer: I think it would eventually result in an insurrection on the part of
the blacks; the black troops that are about being mustered out, and those
that have been mustered out, will all provide themselves with arms; proba-
bly most of them will purchase their arms; and they will not endure those
outrages, without any protection except that which they obtain from Vir-
ginia; they have not confidence in their old masters, notwithstanding their
great love for them, in which they have tried to make us believe.
Question. Are there many arms among the blacks?
Answer: Yes, sir; attempts have been made, in many instances, to disarm
them.
Question. Who have made the attempts?
Answer: The citizens, by organizing what they call "patrols"-combinations
of citizens.
Question: Has that arrangement pervaded the State generally?
Answer: No sir; it has not been allowed; they would disarm the negroes at
once if they could.
Question. Is that feeling extensive?
Answer. I may say it is universal.' 4
101. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMrITEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 21 (1866).
102. Id. at 110.
103. Id. at 112.
104. Id. at 127-28.
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In other words, the need existed to prevent Virginia and other
states from disarming blacks, who were still not recognized as citizens.
The Freedmen's Bureau would soon receive an explicit statutory man-
date to continue its policy of protecting the right to keep and bear
arms.
Senator Howard also interrogated Major General Alfred H. Terry,
who was in command at Richmond, Virginia, and who assisted the
Freedmen's Bureau, as follows:
Question. Have you reason to believe that the blacks possess arms to any
extent at the present time?
Answer. I have been told that they do. I have received that information
from citizens of Virginia, including State officials, who have entreated me
to take the arms of the blacks away from them.
Question. Who were those officials?
Answer. Some were members of the present legislature. I have also been
asked to do so by a public meeting held in one of the counties.
Question. Have you, in any case, issued orders for disarming blacks?
Answer. I have not. 105
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen's Bureau bill
were direct predecessors of the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative
James Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, explained the
meaning of "civil rights and immunities" as used in the civil rights
bill, which also protected in part the related right "to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property .... 106 Referring further to "the great fundamental civil
rights," Representative Wilson pointed out:
Blackstone classifies them under three articles, as follows:
1. The right of personal security; which, he says, "Consists in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation."
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says, "Consists in the power
of locomotion, of changing situation, or'moving one's person to whatever
105. Id. at 143.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (Mar. 1, 1866).
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place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law."
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be, "The free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the law of the land. '107
As will be seen, the Freedmen's Bureau bill explicitly declared
that the rights of personal security and personal liberty included what
Blackstone referred to as "the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence."'
08
On May 23, 1866, the Senate began consideration of what became
the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Jacob M. Howard introduced the
subject on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, promising
to present "the views and the motives which influenced that commit-
tee . . .,.109 After acknowledging the important role of the testimo-
ny before the Joint Committee, Howard examined section 1 of the pro-
posed constitutional amendment.
Senator Howard referred to "the personal rights guarantied and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as the
freedom of speech and of the press; . . .the right to keep and to bear
arns .... ,,flo Because state legislation infringed these rights, adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment was imperative. "The great object
of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees.""'
Howard explained that Congress could enforce the above rights
through section 5 of the proposed amendment, which provided that
"'the Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation
the provisions of this article.' Here is a direct affirmative delegation of
power to Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guaran-
tees, a power not found in the Constitution."' 2 Of the Amendment,
107. Id. at 1118.
108. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 143-44.
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1866).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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Howard added: "It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every
one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental
rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and
to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction."'' 13
Congress passed both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Freedmen's Bureau Act by over two-thirds majority, the former be-
cause the Constitution so required, the latter to override the President's
veto. Expanding on the language of the Civil Rights Act, the
Freedmen's Bureau Act provided protection in the Southern states as
follows:
[Tihe right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoy-
ment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitu-
tional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citi-
zens of such State or district without respect to race or color, or previous
condition of slavery . . . . [T]he President shall, through the commissioner
and the officers of the bureau, and under such rules and regulations as the
President, through the Secretary of War, shall prescribe, extend military
protection and have military jurisdiction over all cases and questions con-
cerning the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights . .. "4
The Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed legisla-
tion requiring the ex-Confederate states, as conditions of reentry into
the Union, to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and to adopt state
constitutions in conformity with that of the United States." 5 Virginia
did so in 1868.
The Virginia convention of 1867-68 readopted the provision of the
Declaration of Rights of 1776 recognizing "a well regulated Militia,
composed of the Body of the People, trained to Arms" under the de-
scriptive label "RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS.""' 6 The formal militia,
composed of all able-bodied males without regard to race, was provid-
113. Id.
114. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866) (emphasis added).
115. Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 429.
116. 1 VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1867-1868, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 350 (1868).
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ed for in a separate article. 1 7 Delegate John Hawnhurst stated: "The
Bill of Rights is a declaration of individual rights, as against the Gov-
ernment. It is an assertion of certain rights that the Government shall
not take away from the individual."'1 Radical Republican Edward K.
Snead added that "the rights declared in the Bill of Rights are natural
and inherent rights, rights which previously existed."'"19
Discussion centered on the fact that the proposed federal Four-
teenth Amendment would confer citizenship on freedmen. The dele-
gates were well aware from the authorities upon which they relied that
"citizenship" carried with it broad rights, including keeping and bear-
ing arms. 2 0
The convention also added a new provision to the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights as follows: "The rights enumerated in this Bill of
Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not
therein expressed."'' Bearing arms for self defense had yet another
foundation.
E. John Randolph Tucker and the Incorporation Dispute
John Randolph Tucker, son of Henry St. George Tucker, served as
Attorney General of Virginia, Representative to Congress, and president
of the American Bar Association. 22 In his treatise on the United
States Constitution, Tucker wrote of the Second Amendment: "This
prohibition indicates that the security of liberty against the tyrannical
117. Id. at 519. The Conservative members complained: "This Constitution further pro-
vides for a militia to be composed of all male citizens . . . without distinction of race or
color." DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 5-6
(Richmond 1867).
118. 1 VA. CONVENTION 421.
119. Id. at 634.
120. Id. at 535-40 (St. Geo. Tucker), 622 (Dred Scott decision), 356 and 403 (right of
revolution).
121. DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
109 (Richmond, 1867). This provision is current. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
122. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1958 (1989).
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tendency of government is only to be found in the right of the people
to keep and bear arms in resisting the wrongs of government.',
2 3
In 1887, Tucker argued for the defendants, who were condemned
to death for murder, in Spies v. Illinois,124 which stemmed from re-
action to police violence against workers in an event known as the
Haymarket Riot. Tucker argued before the Supreme Court that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed the Bill of Rights on the states, there-
by requiring protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination and an impartial jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. When asked how he could represent the radicals, Tucker
replied: "I do not defend anarchy. I defend the Constitution.' 25
Tucker's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the Bill of Rights was consistent with what Senator Howard and other
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment actually said. Tucker told the
Court:
I hold the privilege and immunity of a citizen of the United States to
be such as have their recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution of
the United States . . . .See . . . the Declaration of Rights-the privilege
of freedom of speech and press---of peaceable assemblages of the peo-
ple-of keeping and bearing arms-of immunity from search and sei-
zure-immunity from self-accusation, from second trial-and privilege of
trial by due process of law ....
The position I take is this: Though originally the first ten Amend-
ments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in so far as they
secure and recognize fundamental rights-common law rights-of the man,
they make them privileges and immunities of the man as citizen of the
United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In other words, while the ten Amendments as limitations on
power only apply to the Federal government, and not to the States, yet in
so far as they declare or recognize rights of persons, these rights are
theirs, as citizens of the United States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as
to such rights limits state power, as the ten Amendments had limited Fed-
eral power.
126
123. 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 671 (1899).
124. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 143 (1887).
125. MICHAEL K. CURTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 186 (1986).
126. 123 U.S. at 150-51.
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The Court quoted the last paragraph above in its opinion. 127 The
Court had just finished pointing out that before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and since Barron v. Baltimore,28 the Bill of
Rights had been interpreted as being inapplicable to state action.
2 9
Included in the listed precedents was United States v. Cruikshank,
31
which held that private citizens cannot infringe the First and Second
Amendment rights to assemble and bear arms, and in dictum adding
that those rights only prohibit infringement by Congress. 3 ' Also cit-
ed was Presser v. Illinois, 3 2 another case generated by labor-capital
strife, which held that a prohibition on armed marches (in that case by
workers to protest police violence) does not violate the rights to as-
semble or to bear -arms.133
Tucker sought to use these cases in a favorable manner.
Cruikshank and similar precedents "show that the rights declared in the
first ten Amendments are to be regarded as privileges and immunities
bf citizens of the United States, which, as I insist, are protected as
such by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 134 Presser "did not decide that
the right to keep and bear arms was not a privilege of a citizen of the
United States which a State might therefore abridge, but that a State
could under its police power forbid organizations of armed men, dan-
gerous to the public peace."
135
The Supreme Court completely sidestepped the issue of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. In response to Tucker's argument, the Court stated: "Before
considering whether the Constitution of the United States has the effect
127. Id. at 166.
128. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
129. 123 U.S. at 166.
130. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
131. Id. at 551, 553.
132. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
133. Id. at 265, 267. On the sociohistorical background of Spies and Presser, see L.
H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFFALO L. REv. 373, 386-
91 (1987).
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which is claimed, it is proper to inquire whether the Federal questions
relied on in fact do arise on the face of this record."' 136 That was the
kiss of death for the petitioners, for the Court concluded that the al-
leged violations were not adequately asserted in the trial court, and
thus could not be considered in the Supreme Court. 37 The defen-
dants were executed, and whether the Bill of Rights applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment was left undecided.1
38
III. VmGINIA'S 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT:
GEORGE MASON'S LEGACY COMPLETED
In addition to an explicit guarantee of the right to keep and bear
arms, that right may be found to be a penumbra of and implicit in the
broader rights to life, liberty, and property. 39 Article I, section 1 of
the Virginia Constitution refers to "inherent rights ... the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of ... pursuing and obtaining...
safety."' O4 This provides additional protection for the right to have
arms and to use them for self-defense. 14  "The right of self-de-
fense . . . is founded in the law of nature, and is not, nor can be
superseded by the law of society."' 42 It is well established that "a
person who has been threatened with death or serious bodily harm and
136. Id. at 167.
137. Id. at 181.
138. On the influence of Tucker's argument, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1259-60, 1270-72 (1992).
139. The right to have arms may also be one of those "other rights of the people"
not expressed in a Bill of Rights. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1971). See Nicholas
Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the
Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 6, 37, 64 (1992).
140. VA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
141. Relying on a provision of Ohio's Constitution similar to § 1 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. 1978) upheld the right
to use a firearm in self-defense.
Similarly, Commonwealth v. Ray, 272 A.2d 275, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 292 A.2d 410 (Pa. 1972), invalidated restrictions on the right to
possess firearms based on guarantees similar to both § I and § 13 of the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights. 'The right of a citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or his proper-
ty . . . is a constitutional one arid cannot be diminished by any act of the Legislature."
Id.
142. Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 1, 12 (1884).
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has reasonable grounds to believe that such threats will be carried into
execution, has the right to arm himself in order to combat such an
emergency."1
43
The right is also historically related to the guarantee of a well
regulated militia.'" The Virginia high court has never discussed that
state's Declaration of Rights provision on the right to keep and bear
arms which became effective in 1971, but has reaffirmed the meaning
of a well regulated militia composed of the body of the people, trained
to arms, adopted in 1776.' 4
Other than the slave codes, Virginia's only gun control law on the
books until recent times, a prohibition on the carrying of concealed
weapons, has been the subject of few reported decisions. 146 The
statute was amended over the years to include any person and not
merely free persons, as blacks were no longer prohibited from carrying
weapons; 47 to impose imprisonment of up to twelve months;148 to
delete the word "habitually" and extend the act to cover "any person
[who] carr[ies] about his person, hid from common observation," a
prohibited weapon; 14  and to except from the prohibition police offi-
cers, town or city sergeants, constables, sheriffs, conservators of the
peace, and collecting officers in the discharge of their duties.1 50 The
1896 amendment added the provision that a court "upon a written ap-
143. Bevley v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1946).
144. "The militia embraces the whole arms bearing population ...... Burroughs v.
Peyton, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470, 482 (1864). Code of Virginia, § 44.1 provides that "the
militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall consist of all able bodied citizens . . . and
persons resident" between ages 18 and 55 years old. Previous statutes limited militia mem-
bership to males, but females are included in this language.
In World War II, when the National Guard was drafted and sent overseas, self-
armed reserve militias were called out in the state to guard against sabotage and repel
invasion. "Virginia Reserve Militiamen, whose forefathers, the Minute-men, gained fame in
Revolutionary Days, purchased their own forest green uniforms as well as arms and ammu-
nition." REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR 1945 at 24 (Richmond 1946).
145. See United States v. Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 387, 390, 421 (1847) ("every
man capable of carrying arms").
146. See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 597 (1850).
147. VA. CODE tit. 54, ch. 191, § 7 (1873).
148. Id.
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plication and satisfactory proof of the good character and necessity of
the applicant to carry concealed weapon may grant such permission for
one year .... . Instead of making slaves completely into citizens,
parts of the slave codes were made applicable to citizens.
In Sutherland v. Commonwealth, a hunter who placed his revolver
in latched saddlebags was held not to have been carrying it "about his
person" since it was not readily accessible for immediate use.'52 The
editors at the Virginia Law Register were unhappy with the decision,
and appealed to racism in support of restrictive measures:
It is a matter of common knowledge that in this state and in several oth-
ers, the more especially in the Southern states where the negro population
is so large, that this cowardly practice of "toting" guns has always been
one of the most fruitful sources of crime, and we believe the criminal sta-
tistics will bear us out in this statement. There would be a very decided
falling off of Itllings "in the heat of passion" if a prohibitive tax were laid
on the privilege of handling and disposing of revolvers and other small
arms, or else that every person purchasing such deadly weapons should be
required to register.. . .Let a negro board a railroad train with a quart
of mean whiskey and a pistol in his grip and the chances are that there
will be a murder, or at least a row, before he alights. In that "lawless"
state of Texas, "toting" guns is altogether forbidden, and we all know that
the section of the Byrd law forbidding drinking on railroad trains is so far
a dead letter, that it would hardly prevent this aforesaid son of Ham from
consuming most of the quart even on the cars in this state. 3
Registration and an annual tax of one dollar per pistol or revolver
was later enacted in Virginia.154 But the statute was declared uncon-
stitutional-"the pistol of little value and the revolver of the rich stud-
ded with diamonds are liable to the same direct tax of one dol-
lar"'5 -and repealed.156
151. VA. CODE § 3780 (1904).
152. 65 S.E. 15 (Va. 1909). The Record filed with the Petition at p. 8 notes that the
defendant had been chasing a squirrel through some brush with his pistol.
153. Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons, 15 VA L. REG. 391-92 (1909).
154. 1926 Va. Acts 285-87.
155. Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 13 VA. L. REG., N.S. 746 (Hustings Ct.-Roanoke
1928) (found unconstitutional because it imposed the same tax on all pistols regardless of
value).
156. 1936 Va. Acts 486.
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The political assassinations and urban unrest of the nineteen-sixties
led to the proposal or enactment at the federal and state levels of nu-
merous prohibitions on the right to keep and bear arms. In 1964, the
Virginia General Assembly reacted to proposals for such enactments by
passing a resolution "[c]onceming the inherent right of citizens of this
Commonwealth to own and bear arms" which stated:
WHEREAS, from the landing at Jamestown on to the expansion of
this nation to the Pacific coast, a peaceful society developed in the area
that was wrested from the wilderness by sturdy riflemen armed with their
personal weapons and skilled in their use; and
WHEREAS, the history of this great nation bears witness to the
many benefits derived by a citizenry, free to own-bear-and become
skilled in the use of rifles and other firearms and among these historic
occasions, to mention but a few, were the following: Valley Forge,
Yorktown, New Orleans, the Alamo, Manassas, Chateau Thierry, Tarawa
and Iwo Jima; and
WHEREAS, the right of the citizen is entwined in the very roots of
the founding of this Commonwealth when it was not only the individual's
right to bear arms but his duty to bear arms in the defense of his commu-
nity-only slaves were forbidden by law to carry weapons-Thomas Jef-
ferson deemed the right to bear arms worthy of inclusion in his drafts of
the Virginia Constitution-and the rise or fall of the political rights of the
citizen has been allied with right to bear arms or the deprivation of such
rights; and
WHEREAS, our armed forces have always been dependent upon
citizen soldiers who were familiar with the use of firearms and a capable
and well armed citizenry is an efficient deterrent to any aggressor who
would seek to overthrow this government by conquest or subversion; and
WHEREAS, laws limiting the right to own and bear arms have never
succeeded in deterring crime but have rather served to disarm the public;
and
WHEREAS, the horrible tragedy which befell the Jackson family of
Louisa County at the hands of a fiend could well have been prevented had
Mr. Jackson had available to him a firearm for self defense; and
WHEREAS, many citizens of this Commonwealth who own and
enjoy the use of firearms are greatly disturbed by the proposals of certain
groups to regulate and restrict gun ownership and such citizens are of the
firm and undying conviction that the safety of our nation from enemies
within and without makes even more necessary proper training in the safe
and effective use of firearms which can only be guaranteed by continuation
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RESOLVED by the House of Delegates, the Senate concurring, That
the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the second amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and which right is an inalienable part
of our citizens' heritage in this State shall not be infringed; that any action
taken by the General Assembly of Virginia to interfere with this right
would strike at the basic liberty of our citizens; that no agency of this
State or of any political subdivision should be given any power or seek
any power which would prohibit the purchase or possession of firearms by
any citizen of good standing for the purpose of personal defense, sport,
recreation or other noncriminal activities; and that registration of arms, for
which registration is not presently required, not be required, by legislative
action of this body ...."
The idea that the right to keep and bear arms was a preexisting
right continued to be expressed in Virginia in opposition to federal
proposals in 1968 to register and license firearms owners.158 The fol-
lowing year, the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision solic-
ited and received public views, including a proposal from George S.
Knight of Alexandria, Virginia, "for a constitutional guarantee of the
right to bear arms."'159 However, the Commission failed to recom-
157. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (Va.) 250-251, 472 (1964). It was further resolved that
the resolution be sent to members of the Virginia delegation in Congress "as a reminder
of the fact that laws cannot prevent tragedies but bad laws can bring on in their train
even greater tragedies." Id.
158. The Virginia Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries issued a statement noting
that "such legislation would be obeyed by the law-abiding citizens, no matter how much
they disliked it, and therefore the effect would be to discourage gun ownership and use by
precisely the element in our society whose right to possess and bear arms should not be
infringed." Federal Firearms Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 773 (1968).
159. THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTrrU-
TIONAL REvISION 507 (Charlottesville 1969). George S. Knight explained in an affidavit
dated Oct. 2, 1986 in the author's possession as follows:
As commonly understood in the 1969-1970 period by members of the gener-
al public in Virginia, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" expresses a
personal right of private individuals to keep firearms (including rifles, shotguns,
pistols, and revolvers) and other commonly possessed arms in their homes, busi-
nesses, and other premises, and to bear or carry arms for lawful purposes, includ-
ing defense of self, family, and the Commonwealth.
The right-to-bear-arms guarantee was supported by and adopted to protect the
interests of sportsmen, hunters, and lawabiding persons in general from infringe-
ment of said right, "infringement" -meaning registration of firearms, waiting peri-
ods to purchase firearms, any general prohibition on possession of firearms by
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mend any change to the Declaration of Rights such as would have
made this right more explicit. 60
The purpose of the Knight proposal may be gleaned from a con-
temporaneous newspaper account concerning an organization known as
Fairfax County Citizens Opposing Gun Registration and Licensing,
which consisted of as many as 10,000 members. 16' The group op-
posed an extension of the County's 72-hour waiting period on handgun
purchases to long guns as based on "hysteria" and "beneficial only to
those who seek repression of the individual and supremacy of the
state."'162 George S. Knight, chairman of the group's communications
committee, was identified as a State Department attorney. 163 The arti-
cle reported: "The group also claims credit for the clause insuring 'the
right of the people to keep and bear arms' in Virginia's revised consti-
tution. 'We flooded them with telegrams' one spokesman ex-plained. '' 164
Indeed, in 1969-1970, the Virginia General Assembly proposed
and the public ratified an amendment to section 13 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights so that the section would read: "That a well
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms,
is the proper, natural, and safe defense of free state, therefore, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed .... 65 George Mason, author of section 13 as originally
adopted in 1776, had himself drafted the proposal in 1788 that a feder-
al bill of rights precede the language of section 13 of the Virginia
lawabiding persons, and failure to issue permits to lawabiding persons to carry
firearms not open to common observation for personal protection.
Id.
160. Id. at 98.
161. Jerry Ceppos, Gun Lobbyists Stalk Fairfax, ALEXANDRIA SENTINEL, May 8, 1969,
at 1, 5.
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 1, 5.
164. Id. at 5.
165. PROCEEDING AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, Extra Session 1969/1970 at 473 (1970) (April 2,
1969) (emphasis added) [hereinafter PROCEEDING AND DEBATES].
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Declaration with the words: "That the people have a right to keep and
bear arms .... 166
The 1969-1.970 debate in the House of Delegates, where the
amendment originated in committee, emphasized that the amendment
had the same objectives as the federal Second Amendment. Chief
spokesman was Delegate Lyman C. Harrell, Jr., who assured critics
that the new language would not prevent "reasonable" firearms legisla-
tion such as existed in the federal statutes.' 67 Delegate William R.
Durland suggested that the addition would be "redundant since that
also would be in the first phrase already in the Constitution as written
by George Mason." Harrell replied that "this merely states something
that has been a right and merely puts into the Virginia Constitution
what is in the federal Constitution."'168 Durland made clear that an
individual right was intended because he contemplated moving to
amend the guarantee also to state "and to be protected from the danger
of the abuse of that right as the public safety may require."'
69
When it was moved that the new language be stricken, and that
the original militia language of section 13 should be left as it was,
Harrell reacted that "all people in the Commonwealth over the age of
eighteen years are really a part of the militia of the State of Virgin-
ia."170 Because section 13 already declared that the "militia" was
protected by its definition as "the body of the people, trained to arms,"
this statement suggests that the private keeping and bearing of arms
promoted a well regulated and trained militia composed of the general
166. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 659; 3 MASON, supra note 29, at 1070-71.
167. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 165, at 473. Reference was made by
Mr. Duland to "licensing," which on the federal level applied to dealers in firearms (18
U.S.C. § 923 (1988)) and to "registration," which in federal law applied to machineguns,
short-barrelled shotguns, and destructive devices (26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1988)). Since reason-
able regulations passed by "the Commonwealth or its local subdivisions" were referred to
by Mrs. Marion G. Galland, Durland's reply would also make the new provision consistent
with the state prohibition on carrying concealed weapons in public places without a permit
and parallel municipal ordinances.
168. Id. at 474.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 484.
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populace. The motion to delete the guarantee was defeated 86 to
11.171
The last reference in the House to the amendment was by Dele-
gate D. French Slaughter, who noted that it "confirms the historical
parallel between this Article of the Virginia Constitution and the Sec-
ond Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.'
172
The substance of the amendment was made clearer in the Senate.
Senator George F. Barnes began by noting that "I dare say that not a
person on this floor at the time we opened this session realized that
these words were not in our state Constitution.' ' 3 Barnes recalled
the 1964 General Assembly resolution as follows:
This apparently was of such concern to the General Assembly of Virginia
that in 1964 they passed a resolution, of which I will read part only, to be
brief. ... "[The right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the second
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and which right is an
inalienable part of our citizens' heritage in this state, shall not be in-
fringed, that any action taken by the General Assembly of Virginia to
interfere with this right would strike at the basic liberty of our citi-
zens."'
174
Barnes further quoted writings of Chief Justice of the United
States Earl Warren that the federal Constitution would not have been
adopted without assurances provided by the Second Amendment "au-
thorizing a decentralized militia, guaranteeing the rights of the people
to keep and bear arms . . . ."175 Barnes continued:
More recently the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, writing in connection
with the second amendment, said "Certainly one of the chief guarantees of
freedom under any government, no matter how popular and respected, is
the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms. This is not to say that fire-
arms should not be carefully used and that definite safety rules and pre-
171. Id.
172. Id. at 775.
173. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, Extra Session -1969/1970 at 391 (1970) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA].
174. Id.
175. Id. at 392.
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cautions should not be called into force. But the right of the citizens to
bear arms is just one more guarantee against arbitrary government," one
more safeguard against the tyranny which historically had been the greatest
danger to freedom.
17 6
When Barnes explained that the proposal would mean the same as the
federal Second Amendment, Senator Herbert H. Bateman asked if "it is
really necessary since it is already guaranteed to all the citizens of the
United States." 177 Barnes then yielded to Senator M.M. Long, who
revealed the real interest behind the new provision-sportsmen who
wished to carry arms and all citizens who wished to keep arms in
their homes-as follows:
This is the same wording as is in the Constitutions of thirty-five different
States. And as stated by the Senator from Tazewell, we practically adopted
the same thing in a resolution in 1964.
The object and purpose of it is not to cripple law enforcement or
anything of that sort. It is simply that the sportsmen of this State are very
much interested in it. They think that they should have it since it is in the
Constitution of thirty-five States and is guaranteed to the citizens by the
second amendment to the Constitution of the. United States which has been
in force for many, many years. It is certainly not for the purpose of start-
ing up the Hatfields and McCoys again or anything of that sort. But some
citizens feel that they should be permitted to have arms in their homes,
and they think that this will give them some protection.1 78
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 393. This discussion, which clearly indicates that an individual right was
contemplated, is not mentioned in Professor A.E. Dick Howard's argument that the only
right guaranteed was to serve in the militia. Howard is correct in that the same rights
thought to be guaranteed in the federal Second Amendment were intended to be protected
in the revised Virginia Declaration of Rights. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITTION OF
VIRGmIA 265-77 (1974).
Contrary to the controversial law review article which Howard relies on for the
exclusive militia interpretation, Virginians have always interpreted the Second Amendment
as guaranteeing a private right to keep and bear arms. This is clear in the 1964 resolution
and the 1969-1970 debates, not to mention the thought of James Madison, St. George
Tucker, and similar early figures. As the former Attorney General of Virgina stated: "I do
not believe that restrictions placed on the ownership or lawful use of guns by honest citi-
zens will reduce crime to the point where it warrants infringing on the constitutional right
to bear arms in self-defense, a guarantee inherent in the Constitutions of Virginia and the
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The only dissenter was Senator Harry E. Howell, Jr., who thought
that the militia should be confined to the National Guard and that
constitutional protection of the right of the people to keep and bear
arms should not be recognized.'79 Senator Long agreed with Senator
Bateman that the amendment was intended "to realign the language of
our Bill of Rights on this subject with the language and the purpose
and the same protections as are in the second amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United Sates." The arms guarantee then passed thirty-
one to one. 80
The arms guarantee was part of a general revision of the Virginia
Constitution which was laid before the voters as Proposal No. 1. At
the November 1970 elections, it passed by a vote of 576,776 to
226,219, and became effective in 1971.181
The public doubtlessly read the proposal as recognizing a private
right to keep arms in the home and to carry them, at least openly.
8 2
Restrictive measures proposed or enacted in Congress and the various
states had threatened the right, and a written guarantee would give it
more security. While a right to keep and bears arms had always been
assumed in Virginia, the public adopted explicit language in the Decla-
ration of Rights as amended in 1971 to insure that it would be un-
questioned.
Bearing arms in a militia (as well as not in a militia) is protected
by the language of the guarantee, but was not the impetus for its
adoption. Even less was the amendment intended to guarantee the exis-
179. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 173, at 393-
94.
180. Id. at 394.
181. VA. CONST. art. I and IV.
182. Alexandria Delegate Marion G. Galland criticized the proposal as follows:
There were minor lapses of the modem spirit, as in the case of adding a guaran-
tee in the Bill of Rights of the right to bear arms. It was a meaningless bow to
the "gun nuts" since it appears as part of the section providing for a militia. The
idea seemed to be that every citizen will have his gun at the ready against the
day some new Paul Revere thunders through every hamlet in Virginia shouting
"To arms, Brothers. The enemy is at our gates!"
M. Galland, Assembly Has Progressive Image, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, May 12, 1969, at 5.
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tence of the National Guard, the only controversy concerning which
existed in the 1969-1970 period was its deployment at college campus-
es (such as Kent State University) and inner city ghettos. No one com-
plained that the right of National Guard members to keep and bear
arms was being infringed. 8 3 Instead, the perceived threats giving rise
to the arms guarantee were the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 and
more restrictive proposals at the state and federal levels.
The Virginia Supreme Court has never mentioned the arms guar-
antee. However, chivalry took a blow in 1979 when Schaaf v. Com-
monwealth"&4 ruled that a woman with a pistol for self-protection in
an unzippered purse carried it concealed "about her person" since it
was readily accessible. 85 The Court distinguished the traditional
"saddlebags" defense, and suggested that Mrs. Schaff should and could
have obtained a permit before carrying a pistol in her purse.'86
Sandiford v. Commonwealth 87 ruled unconstitutional a statutory
presumption that possession of a short barrelled shotgun by an
unnaturalized foreigner is for an offensive or aggressive purpose. "We
183. Indeed, such an argument would have been absurd since the National Guard is a
creation of the state. Soldiers do not need a guarantee to bear arms on duty. Their'rights
are completely dependent on what the state allows, and the state cannot infringe its own
"rights."
184. 2.58 S.E.2d 574, 575 (Va. 1990).
185. This holding was reached despite the fact that the Virginia Attorney General and
even the Commonwealth Attorney who prosecuted Mrs. Schaaf had advised that a pistol in
a ladies purse was not sufficiently accessible to be considered about her person. Report of
the Attorney General 80 (Va. 1965-66); Commonwealth's Attorney's Memorandum (May
28, 1969), reproduced in brief of Appellant at 5-6. As Justice Compton pointed out in his
dissent, the Virginia legislature had tactily assdnted to this interpretation because it had not
amended the statute after the 1909 Sutherland ruling. Moreover, since the statute uses the
language "any person carry about his person," the concealed weapon "must be in touch
with a member of the body or in touch with clothing, coverings, or other items worn
about the body." Schaaf, 258 S.E.2d at 576.
As a practical matter, the Virginia gentlemen on the high court probably decided
Schaaf as they did not because they liked male hunters with saddlebags but not women
with purses, but because of where the Pistols were carried. Mr. Sutherland was walking
down a country road, while Mrs. Schaaf was having her purse x-ray screened while enter-
ing a courtroom. Since no law prohibited taking a firearm to court, concealed carry was
the only offense with which to charge Mrs. Schaaf.
186. Id. at 575.
187. 225 S.E.2d 409 (Va. 1976).
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see no rational connection between a person's place of birth and his
disposition to commit offensive or aggressive acts."1 88 The Court
concluded: "Mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun by a citizen (nat-
ural or not naturalized) raises no presumption of an unlawful pur-
pose,... and we hold that [the code] created such a presumption
based upon mere possession by an unnaturalized foreign-born person, it
denied Sandiford equal protection and due process of law."189
Whether Virginia's prohibition on purchase of more than one
handgun each month violates the arms guarantee depends on the nature
of the right. The preamble to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
is Article 1 of the Constitution, states: "A Declaration of Rights made
by the good people of Virginia in the exercise of their sovereign pow-
ers, which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis
and foundation of government." There follows an enumeration of spe-
cific rights, including the following: "That a well regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed .... "190 Ac-
cordingly, keeping and bearing arms is a fundamental right of all law-
abiding individuals which may not be infringed.
The need to rely on the text of the guarantee and the meaning
attributed to it by the framers is particularly relevant in the interpreta-
tion of individual rights, since government has only such power as the
people authorize. The Virginia Supreme Court has artfully stated:
The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards, and preserves in basic
form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits and modes of thought and
life of the people as developed under the common law and as existed at
the time of its adoption to the extent and as therein stated ....
The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the
constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who
ratified it is to be made effective.191
188. Id. at 410.
189. Id. at 411.
190. VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
191. Dean v. Paolicelli, 72 S.E.2d 506, 510 (Va. 1952).
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Moreover, the "plain mandates [of constitutions] should not be
disregarded because conditions change .... Nor do exigent circum-
stances justify judicial sophistry as a means to circumvent them." 192
Fundamental rights under the Virginia Constitution may not be
unreasonably regulated, by a procedure "which imposes arbitrary, op-
pressive and unwarranted requirements . *.. ., Setting an arbitrary
number of firearms a citizen may purchase in a given time period
would seem to be of this nature.
Since keeping and bearing arms for personal protection is a consti-
tutional right, the proposal would violate both the right to keep and
bear arms and the right to due process. As was held in a Connecticut
case concerning a pistol permit: "It appears that a Connecticut citizen,
under the language of the Connecticut constitution, has a fundamental
right to bear arms in self-defense, a liberty interest which must be
protected by procedural due process."' 94 Keeping and bearing arms is
also considered a "fundamental right" in Virginia, since it is "explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."'195
The existence of a constitutional right to have an object, whether
a newspaper or a firearm, implies a right to purchase that object.
Virginia's high court has noted: "Liberty of the press embraces the
circulation and distribution of magazines and periodicals as well as
religious literature . . . .The ordinance . . . permits the punishment of
192. Galax v. Appalachian E.P. Co., 12 S.E.2d 778, 779 (Va. 1941).
193. York v. City of Danville, 152 S.E.2d 259, 263 (Va. 1967). That case stated in
more detail:
We conclude that the provision in the ordinance requiring that application
for a parade permit be filed with the chief of police "not less than thirty days
nor more than sixty days before the date on which it is proposed to conduct the
parade" is an arbitrary and unreasonable prior restraint upon the rights of freedom
of speech and assembly guaranteed to the defendants under the provisions of the
Constitution of Virginia and the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 264.
194. Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 491 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
195. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 51 (1973),
approved in Arlington County v. Richards, 231 S.E.2d 231, 234 (Va. 1977).
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incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of a free
press."'
1 96
The Virginia courts frequently look favorably at precedents from
its sister state North Carolina. "North Carolina decisions have interpret-
ed our Constitution as guaranteeing the right to bear arms to the peo-
ple in a collective sense-similar to the concept of a militia-and also
to individuals.' 9 7 "'Pistol' ex vi termini is properly included in the
word 'arms,' and that the right to bear such arms cannot be in-
fringed."' 98 Accordingly, a Virginia court should look askance at a
law prohibiting distribution of arms to law-abiding persons.
IV. THE PoLITIcs OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
ATTORNEY GENERAL TERRY, HANDGUN RATIONING,
AND THE "COLLECTIVE RIGHT" TO FORM MILmAS
On January 4, 1993, Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry
announced support for legislation which would criminalize the purchase
of two or more handguns per month. A press report explained:
Attorney General Mary Sue Terry, the likely Democratic nominee for
governor this year, threw her support Monday behind proposals to place a
one-a-month limit on handgun purchases.
In a prepared statement, Terry said the limit "is a sensible response
to reduce the commonwealth's role in gun trafficking, while at the same
time protecting the rights of law-abiding gun owners, sportsmen and col-
lectors." . . .
Gun control is expected to be hotly debated in the legislature. The
issue could give [Virginia Governor Douglas] Wilder and Terry a chance
to find common ground as the attorney general prepares her campaign to
succeed Wilder as governor."'
Eight days later, Attorney General Terry issued an official opinion
concerning whether a prohibition on purchase of more than one hand-
gun per month would violate Article I, Section 13 of the Virginia
196. Robert v. City of Norfolk, 49 S.E.2d 697, 703-04 (Va. 1948).
197. State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968).
198. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1921).
199. Terry Supports Monthly Limit on Gun Buying, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993 at
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Constitution.200 Not surprisingly, Attorney General Terry found that
such enactment would not violate what she repeatedly referred to as
the "right to bear arms. 2 0' A right to purchase arms would be relat-
ed more closely to the right to keep arms.
Terry set forth no analysis of the meaning of the words "the right
of the people to keep ...arms shall not be infringed" or the penum-
bras of this right. Not discussed in her opinion were the questions of
whether handgun purchasers were "people," whether the purchase of
handguns was necessary to "keep" them, whether handguns are "arms,"
and whether a purchase limitation of one per month would be an
"infringement." Instead, the opinion relies on selective citations of
authorities.
Terry first sought to show that Virginia's Article I, Section 13 is
"coextensive" with the federal Second Amendment.0 2 Terry quoted
several statements in the General Assembly debate on what became the
1971 Constitution expressing the opinion that Virginia's arms proposal
was similar to the Second Amendment.20 3 Terry's quotations were
identical to those set forth in Professor A.E. Dick Howard's treatise,
which she also cited. °4
Both Terry and Howard sought to show that Virginia's provision
means the same as the federal Constitution and that the latter protects
no individual right, thereby rendering the former lifeless. Yet the mem-
bers of the General Assembly, in debating what became the 1971
Constitution, did believe that the Second Amendment guarantees indi-
vidual rights, and that the Virginia provision would do the same. Terry
and Howard both began by quoting Senator M.M. Long's statement
that the proposal would protect the same rights as the Second
Amendment, but ignored Long's explanation in the very same passage
200. Letter of Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, to Delegate S. Vance Wilkins, Jr.
(January 13, 1993) to be published as an official opinion in [Richmond] ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA (Richmond 1993) [hereinafter Letter of Mary
Sue Terry].
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 2-4.
204. Id. at 2 (citing 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIR-
GINIA 274, 277 (1974)).
[Vol. 96:1
50
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/4
RATIONING FIREARMS PURCHASES
that it would protect "the sportsmen of this State," that the right "is
guaranteed to the citizens by the second amendment," and that "some
citizens feel that they should be permitted to have arms in their
homes . . ,205 Not one member of the General Assembly suggested
that the guarantee would protect not individuals but a "collective right"
of the National Guard to exist, or that any segment of the public de-
manded recognition of such a right. The acknowledgment that the
guarantee would still allow certain regulations concerning firearms
possessed by individuals makes clear that its subject was individual
rights, not state militia powers..
It is patently absurd to suggest that Virginia's guarantee was
passed so that the state would not infringe on the "right" of the very
same state to organize a National Guard. It goes without saying that
the right to keep and bear arms had been viewed as an individual right
by Virginians from George Mason, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry,
and James Madison in the eighteenth century, to St. George Tucker
and J. Randolph Tucker in the nineteenth century, and to the members
of the 1964 General Assembly.
Having equated the Virginia guarantee with the Second Amend-
ment, Terry reduced the Second Amendment to utter oblivion in all
but three sentences, each of which is adorned with authoritative dress-
ing. Terry's first proposition is: "In 1876, the Supreme Court of the
United States overturned a person's criminal conviction for an alleged
violation of another person's Second Amendment right of 'bearing
arms for a lawful purpose,' concluding that '[t]his is not a right grant-
ed by the Constitution. ' ' '206 Terry's apparent insinuation is that the
right is not protected at all by the Constitution, an implication at odds
with the text of the Second Amendment. In fact, Cruikshank stated of
the First Amendment:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed
long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact,
it is and always had been, one of the attributes of citizenship under a free
205. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA supra note 173, at
393.
206. Letter of Mary Sue Terry, supra note 200, at 4 (citing United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)).
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government . . . . It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by
the Constitution."
The Supreme Court then subjected the Second Amendment to the
same analysis as the First: "The right there specified [in the indict-
ment] is that of bearing arms for a lawful purpose. This is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence. 208
In other words, Cruikshank recognized the First and Second
Amendments both to protect fundamental rights which predated, and
thus were not "granted" by, the Constitution. The protection of these
ancient rights from governmental infringement is in no way diluted by
the Supreme Court's holding that a private person cannot violate
them.209
Robertson v. Baldwin210 left no doubt that the right to bear arms
is a fundamental, individual right which the states may reasonably
regulate but may not infringe:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the con-
stitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay
down any novel principle of government, but simply to embody certain
guarantees and immunities which we had inherited from our English an-
cestors . . . In incorporating those principles into the fundamental law
there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to
be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus .... the right
of the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.21'
Terry's second proposition meant to negate the Second Amend-
ment is simple: "Since then, the federal courts consistently have held
that the Second Amendment confers only a collective right upon the
citizens of the states to form militias. 212 Terry then cites two United
207. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876).
208. Id. at 553.
209. Id. at 551-53.
210. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
211. Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
212. Letter of Mary Sue Terry, supra note 200, at 4.
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States Supreme Court cases and four federal appellate cases.213 Nei-
ther one of the Supreme Court opinions make such a statement about
this holistic and mystical "collective right," nor do they remotely sug-
gest that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" actually
means "the power of the state to maintain a militia." The four appel-
late opinions were all rendered years or even decades after the Vir-
ginia General Assembly met in 1969-70.214 It is disingenuous, at
best, to insist that the members of the General Assembly agreed with
assertions about the Second Amendment in federal opinions published
long after the Assembly met.
One of the two Supreme Court cases cited by Terry is Presser v.
Illinois.215 Presser was indicted under an Illinois act for parading
four hundred armed men in Chicago on public streets without a license
from the governor. The Court rejected defendant's claim that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects a right to form a private military unit:
The sections under consideration, which only forbid bodies of men to
associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms
in cities and towns unless authorized by law, do not infringe the right of
the people to keep and bear arms. But a conclusive answer to the conten-
tion that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the
fact that the amendment is a limitation upon the power of Congress and
the National government, and not upon that of the States.1 6
In short, the Court held that the armed paraders went beyond the
individual right of keeping and bearing of arms, adding in dictum that
the Second Amendment does not apply directly to the states. Similarly,
the Court rejected a First Amendment right of assembly applicable to
213. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886); United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988); Quilici v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 659 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States
v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v.
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974).
214. They also represent opinions of only four of the thirteen federal courts of ap-
peals. And even one of those four circuits (the Eighth) has not been consistent. See United
States v. Wiley, 309 F. Supp. 141, 145 (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 438 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.
1971).
215. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
216. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
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Presser's band, because "the right voluntarily to associate together as a
military company, or to drill or parade with arms . . . is not an attrib-
ute of national citizenship. 217
Presser did, however, recognize that the states may not infringe
on the right to keep and bear arms:
All citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force
or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in
view of this prerogative of the general government ... the States cannot,
even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit
the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.
But . . . the sections under consideration do not have this effect.21
Finally, Presser simply did not consider whether the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms from State in-
fringement. In fact, that issue has not been addressed by the Supreme
Court to date.21
9
The other Supreme Court case cited by Attorney General Terry is
United States 1,. Miller,220 which concerned the status under the Sec-
ond Amendment of the National Firearms Act, which required regis-
tration and taxation of certain narrowly-defined firearms. A district
court found the National Firearms Act to be unconstitutional on its
face as violative of the Second Amendment, and dismissed an indict-
ment for transporting in interstate commerce a shotgun with a barrel
217. Id. at 267.
218. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
219. A year after Presser was decided, Chief Justice Waite, the author of Cruikshank,
wrote the opinion in Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). Spies cited Cruikshank and
Presser as authority that the first ten amendments applied to the federal government but
not the states. Id. at 166. A separate argument was made that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected Bill of Rights guarantees from state infringement. Id. 151-52, 166-67. The Court
did not suggest that the incorporation issue was already decided, but reviewed the record
and then refused to decide the issue because it was not raised in the trial court. Id. at
181.
220. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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less than eighteen inches without the required tax stamp.22' The Su-
preme Court reversed based on the following:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length"
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi-
ciency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amend-
ment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it
is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common de-
fense. " z
Accordingly, the Court remanded the cause to the district court for
further proceedings.223 Consistent with the above, these proceedings
would have entailed the taking of evidence about the nature of the
shotgun. Since no factual record was made in the trial court that a
"sawed-off' shotgun could have militia uses, the Court did not consid-
er whether the tax and related registration requirements of the National
Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment. The Court assumed
that, if the shotgun was a protected "arm" under the Second Amend-
ment, the tax and registration requirements may have been unconstitu-
tional, for otherwise the Court could have disposed of that issue with-
out remanding the case.
Further, the Court assumed that the Second Amendment protects
all individuals, not just members of an organized force such as the
National Guard. The test was not whether the person in possession of
the arm was a member of a formal militia unit, but whether the arm
"at this time" is "ordinary military equipment" or its use "could" po-
tentially assist in the common defense. Had the Court assumed that the
Second Amendment did not protect ordinary persons, it would not
have remanded the case to determine the factual status of the arm.
The Court also discussed the meaning of the Second Amendment.
Referring to the militia clause of the Constitution, the Court stated that
"to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of
221. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
222. 307 U.S. at 178.
223. Id. at 183.
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such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment
were made. 224 The Court then surveyed colonial and state militia
laws to demonstrate that "the Militia comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense" and that "these
men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and
of the kind in common use at the time.
225
The philosophy behind the Second Amendment was well articu-
lated in the commentaries of Justice Joseph Story and Judge Thomas
M. Cooley, which Miller approvingly cites. 226 Justice Story stated:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered,
as the palladium of the liberties of the republic; since it offers a strong
moral check against usurpation and arbitrary power of the rulers; and will
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the
people to resist and triumph over them. 27
Judge Cooley's statement referenced by the Court is as follows:
Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the right of the
people to keep and bear arms . . . .The alternative to a standing army is
'a well-regulated militia'; but this cannot exist unless the people are
trained to bearing arms. The federal and state constitutions therefore pro-
vide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed.228
224. Id. at 178.
225. Id. at 179.
226. Id. at 183 n.3.
227. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 646 (5th ed. 1891). "One of
the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purpose without resistance is, by
disarming the people, and making it an offense to keep arms . . . ." 2 J. STORY, A FA-
MILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (1893).
228. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 729 (1874). T. COOLEY, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-82 (2d ed. 1891) states further:
The right declared was meant to be a strong moral check against the usurpation
and arbitrary power of rulers, and as a necessary and efficient means of regaining
rights when temporarily overturned by usurpation.
The right is General-It may be supposed from the phraseology of this
provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia;
but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent . . . .But the law
may make provision for the enrollment of all who are fit to perform military
duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision
at all; and if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaran-
ty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government
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Thus, contrary to Attorney General Terry, neither Miller nor
Cruikshank uses the term "collective right" or implies that the Second
Amendment does not protect individual rights. Of the four federal
appellate cases cited by Terry, one does not support her argument, 22 9
while three do so, but only in dictum. 2 30 While Terry claimed that
federal courts "consistently" supported a "collective rights" theory,
some federal courts have recognized the right to be an individual
right.231 More significantly, Terry wholly ignored the abundance of
state precedents concerning the fundamental, individual character of the
it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is that
the people from whom the militia must be taken shall have the right to keep and
bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose.
Id.
229. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (2-1 opinion),
cert. denied 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The majority in this case decided that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states, but did not decide that the Second Amendment
does not recognize an individual right. Instead, the court noted the Miller holding that "the
right to keep and bear arms extends only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a
well regulated militia." Id. at 270. While factually incorrect, the court asserted that "we do
not consider individually owned handguns to be military weapons." Id. at 270 n.8. To the
contrary, the federal Civilian Marksmanship Program encourages the purchase and use of
.45 caliber military pistols or commercial pistols of the same type for "matches [which]
are intended to promote the national defense." 32 C.F.R. §§ 544.4(b), 544.52(d) (1985).
230. None of those three cases, see supra note 213, include any scholarly analysis
supportive of that thesis. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1974) (explaining that a court appointed attorney made a preposterous argument that Sec-
ond Amendment protects felon's purchase of firearm; unsupported dictum about "a collec-
tive right").
231. Felons are "a separate class whose individual right to bear arms may be prohibit-
ed." United States v. Wiley, 309 F. Supp. 141, 145 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1971); see also United States v. Bowdach, 414 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 n.1l (S.D.
Fla. 1976) (explaining that "possession of the shotgun by a non-felon has no legal conse-
quences. U.S. Const. Amend. II."), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); Gilbert Equip.
Co. v. Higgins, 709 F. Supp. 1071, 1090 (S.D. Ala. 1989) (explaining that the Second
Amendment "guarantees to all Americans 'the right to keep and bear arms"'), aff'd, 894
F.2d 412 (lth Cir. 1990) (mem.); United States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir.
1975) (holding that "there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a
firearm") (emphasis added); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942)
(holding that the statute "undoubtedly curtails to some extent the right of individuals to
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right to keep and bear arms under the state constitutions,232 including
those with language identical with the federal Second Amendment.233
Attorney' General Terry's third and final assertion about the Sec-
ond Amendment states: "The Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment on the Second Amendment is its statement that 'legislative re-
strictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally
suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected
liberties.' ' 234
Terry's deletion of the first word of the sentence of the Supreme
Court opinion radically changed its meaning. In Lewis, the court was
reviewing a conviction of receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon. In
the footnote Attorney General Terry referenced, the Court actually
stated: "These legislative restrictions [i.e., a felon may not receive a
firearm in interstate commerce] on the use of firearms are neither
based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon
any constitutionally protected liberties. 235 Since "a legislature consti-
tutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities
far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm"-including the
exercise of other civil liberties, and may even deprive a felon of life
itself-felons have no fundamental right to keep and bear arms. 236
Lewis explicitly reaffirmed the Miller rule that the Second Amendment
protects possession of "a firearm" with a militia nexus, and does not
232. See City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 143 (W. Va. 1988) (explain-
ing that "[i]n several cases where courts have considered the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances in light of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms for
defensive purposes, proscriptive laws infringing on that constitutionally protected right have
been voided."). In at least twenty reported cases, state courts have declared laws to be un-
constitutional as violative of the right to keep and bear arms. Robert Dowlut, Bearing
Arms in State Bills of Rights, Judicial Interpretation, and Public Housing, 5 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 203, 206 n.31 (1992).
233. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C. 1962); State v. Kemer, 107
S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921). Georgia courts have held that the federal Second Amendment guar-
antees an individual right which the states may not infringe. Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243,
250 (1846); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 325 S.E.2d 465, 466-67 (Ga. App. Ct. 1985).
234. Letter of Mary Sue Terry, supra note 200, at 4 (citing Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980)).
235. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 66.
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merely protect a person with a militia nexus.2 37 Lewis did not say
that the right to keep and bear arms is not a fundamental right of law-
abiding citizens. As the Court stated elsewhere, a "fundamental right"
includes a right "explicitly . . . guaranteed by the Constitution."' 38
Nor was Terry accurate concerning Lewis being the Supreme
Court's "most recent pronouncement" on the Second Amendment. Ten
years after Lewis, in the 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,239 the court made clear that the Second Amendment pro-
tects the rights of all law-abiding persons:
"The people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts
of the Constitution .... The Second Amendment protects "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the
people." See also U.S. Const. amend. I, ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble") .... While
this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the peo-
ple" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.24
Concurring, Justice Stevens added that "aliens who are lawfully
present in the United States are among those 'people' who are entitled
237. Id. at 65 n.8. Miller essentially follows the civilized warfare test followed in old
and new cases. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871); State v. Swanton, 692
P.2d 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
238. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
239. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
240. Id. at 265-66. On the original meaning of the Second Amendment as a protection
of individual rights, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1162-68 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of
the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VALPARAISO U.
L. REV. 131 (1991).
Congress has recognized "the rights of citizens to keep and bear arms under the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution .... " Firearms Owners' Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND -BEAR
ARMS, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982) concludes that "what is protected is an individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner."
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to the protection of the Bill of Rights . ... ,,24' Dissenting, Justice
Brennan noted that "the term 'the people' is better understood as a
rhetorical counterpoint 'to the government,' such that rights that were
reserved to 'the people' were to protect all those subject to 'the gov-
ernment."' 242
Moreover, the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey243 made clear that explicit substantive guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights are protected from state violation. The Court
set forth the following broad interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause: "The controlling word in the case
before us is 'liberty' . . . Thus all fundamental rights comprised
within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from
invasion by the States."2 4
The Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment extends its
protection to, but is not limited by, the guarantees expressed in the
Bill of Rights:
The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights. We have held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of
the Bill of Rights against the States .... It is tempting, as a means of
curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompass-
es no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against
federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight amendments
to the Constitution .... But of course this Court has never accepted that
view.2
Fourteenth Amendment protections may be expanded (but certainly
not reduced) beyond the practices which existed at the time it was
ratified. 24 6 "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm
241. 494 U.S. at 279.
242. Id. at 282.
243. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
244. Id. at 2804.
245. Id.
246. Seventeen of the twenty-eight states (61%) that ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by July 9, 1868 (the date it was ratified by a sufficient number of states) had con-
stitutions which explicitly guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms. See STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EvOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
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of personal liberty which the government may not enter."2 47 The
Court stated:
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects . . . . As the second Justice Harlan recognized:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of
the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion . . . [such as] the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms .... It is a rational continu-
um which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all sub-
stantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless re-
248straints .... 4
Thus, Planned Parenthood recognizes "the right to keep and bear
arms" as one of the "specific guarantees" provided in the Constitution.
This right is protected from congressional infringement by the Second
Amendment and, as noted above, from state infringement by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 249
After the above, which can be described at best as only a superfi-
cial analysis, Attorney General Terry concludes:
The "right to bear arms" phrase of Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of
Virginia is synonymous with the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Under long standing federal case law the Second Amendment
covers only a collective right to bear arms. It is thus my opinion that
legislation allowing a person to purchase no more than one handgun in a
134 & nn. 202-07 (1984). To date, forty-three state constitutions protect the right to keep
and bear arms.
247. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
248. Id. at 2805 (emphasis added).
249. Moreover, even for a right not specified in the Bill of Rights, one is entitled to
"freedom from all substantial arbitrary intrusions and purposeless restraints." Limiting hand-
gun purchases to one per month may be arbitrary and purposeless in view of the fact that
the interstate trafficking problem could be addressed by requiring positive proof of identifi-
cation and residence by persons obtaining driver's licenses.
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thirty-day period would not violate either the Second Amendment or Arti-
cle I, § 13.250
Having advocated such legislation before rendering this opinion, the
Attorney General gave the appearance that the opinion was based on
political, not legal considerations. Terry's subsequent announcement
that she was running for governor, and that "gun control" legislation
would be a major campaign issue, lends credence to that appearance.
As for Professor Howard's argument that the Virginia guarantee
and the Second Amendment do not protect an individual right to own
arms but "guarantees all citizens the right to serve in the militia,"' '
it is difficult to understand why the citizenry would have demanded
recognition of such a right, why the General Assembly would have
been concerned with such a right, or on what theory a court could
recognize such a right. Citizens have feared that legislators would
confiscate or interfere with their possession of private arms. No one
has claimed a constitutional right to job entitlement in the National
Guard. Is every individual guaranteed employment by the Guard, re-
gardless of the Guard's needs or lack thereof? Professor Howard
makes no attempt to articulate exactly what is entailed in this supposed
"right to serve in the militia," or to expose the contours of this
"right."
No constitutional right deserves to be treated with such superficial-
ity as has the right to keep and bear arms. The unpopularity of this
right with certain segments of the political elite recalls St. George
Tucker's point that a bill of rights is meant to give information to the
people, the ultimate guardians of liberty.
250. Letter of Mary Sue Terry, supra note 200, at 5.
251. A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 266, 273, 277
(1974). [hereinafter HOWARD]. HOWARD relies principally on a 1966 law review article for
his conclusions about the Second Amendment. See id. at 266 n.2. Far more comprehensive
and current scholarship demonstrates the individual character of the right to keep and bear
arms. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. REV. 637
(1989).
Nonetheless, HOWARD recognizes that United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178
(1939), "could be read to imply that a citizen has a right to possess any weapon which
could be shown to be an effective military instrument." Id. at 277.
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V. KEEPING ARMS FOR DEFENSE, HUNTING AND RECREATION:
WEST VIRGINIA'S 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
A. The Status Quo Ante
Virginia's secession from the United States in 1861 sparked West
Virginia's secession from Virginia. The Wheeling convention which
effected the latter act depicted itself as the true heir to the Virginia
Bill of Rights, which reserved to the people, not a convention, such as
the one that met at Richmond, the power to alter or abolish govern-
ment. 2 Accusing Confederacy supporters of treason, the Wheeling
convention issued its statement as "[a] Declaration of the People of
Virginia.' '2s3
Framed in the midst of war, the West Virginia Constitution of
1863 was rather short on declaring rights, and the right to keep and
bear arms was not proposed at the convention that framed it.25
4
At the convention which framed the constitution of 1872, only one
pertinent proposal was made. Delegate Hagans submitted a motion
resolving:
That the Committee on the Bill of Rights be requested to inquire into the
expediency of reporting in connection with a provision that citizens of this
State are authorized to bear and carry arms, that any person who carries
concealed weapons shall be guilty of a felony, and be punished by con-
finement in the penitentiary, on conviction thereof, not less than five nor
more than twenty years. 5
The committee reported back, mentioning only the criminal provision,
that it was "inexpedient to report such a provision in the Con-
252. ORDINANCES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT WHEELING 1 (Wheeling, W.
Va. 1861).
253. Id.
254. See DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
WEST VIRGINIA (Huntington, W. Va. 1939).
255. JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 61 (Charleston, W. Va. 1872).
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stitution,' 26  and the convention concurred.257 There things would
remain for over a century.
In State v. Workman,2  the West Virginia Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction and $25.00 fine of a person for carrying a con-
cealed weapon.25 9 At trial, the defendant relied on that part of the
statute allowing the defense that he did so believing that he was in
danger of death at the hands of a certain person, but failed to prove
his own good character.26°
On appeal, not having a state arms guarantee on which to rely,
the defendant urged that the statute violated the federal Second
Amendment. The Supreme Court replied:
Supposing this to be a restriction upon legislation by the several states, as
well as by the congress (a question upon which authorities differ,) we may
still conclude that by law to regulate a conceded right is not necessarily to
infringe the same. Thus, a prohibition against passing any law abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press would scarcely be so construed as
to prohibit all statutes defining and punishing slander or criminal li-
bel .... The second amendment of our federal constitution should be
construed with reference to the provisions of the common law upon this
subject as they then existed, and in consonance with the amendment itself,
as defined in what may be called its "preamble. 261
While assuming that the Second Amendment applied to the states
directly, the court did not mention whether the Second Amendment
might apply to the states indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment,
an issue the United States Supreme Court explicitly refused to decide
three years after Workman was decided.262 The above comment that
the Second Amendment must be construed in accord with the common
256. Id. at 69.
257. Id. at 90.
258. 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891).
259. W. VA. CODE, Ch. 148, § 7 (2d ed. 1887), made it unlawful to "carry about his
person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, razor, slung shot, billy, metallic or
other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or charac-
ter .... " Both concealed and open carrying were thus proscribed.
260. 14 S.E. at 10.
261. Id. at 11.
262. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1894).
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law assumed that the right is individual, for the power of states to
maintain militias was no part of the common law. The court quoted a
statute passed in the reign of Edward 111,263 but failed to mention
that the statute was construed only "to punish people who go armed to
terrify the King's subjects.' '264 It required a showing of "malo animo
[evil intent]" and allowed "gentlemen to ride armed for their securi-
ty .... ,,265 An antebellum Virginia authority explained:
In the exposition of the statute of Edward, it has been resolved, that no
wearing of arms is within its meaning, unless it be accompanied with such
circumstances as are apt to terrify the people; that no person is within its
meaning, who arms himself to suppress dangerous rioters, rebels, or ene-
mies, and endeavors to suppress or resist such disturbers of the peace: ...
no one will incur the penalty of the statute, for assembling his neighbors
and friends in his own house, against those who threaten to do him any
violence therein, because a man's house is as his castle.266
Yet Workman did correctly state the rule of these cases that "at
common law the 'going around with unusual and dangerous weapons
to the terror of the people' was a criminal offense., 267 Carrying a
concealed pistol was a common law right, because a pistol was not an
unusual weapon and its concealment precluded causing terror to others.
Indeed, Workman stated:
The keeping and bearing of arms therefore, which at the date of the
amendment was intended to be protected as a popular right, was not such
as the common law condemned, but was such a keeping and bearing as
the public liberty and its preservation commended as lawful, and worthy of
protection.268
The court then discussed which "arms" are protected by the Second
Amendment as follows:
263. 14 S.E. at 11.
264. Rex v. Knight, 87 Eng. Rep. 76 (K.B. 1686).
265. Id., Comb. 38-39, 90 Eng. Rep. 30.
266. J. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 32 (Philadelphia 1838).
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So, also, in regard to the kind of arms referred to in the amendment, it
must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia,
such as swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,-arms to be used in defending
the state and civil liberty,-and not to pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuck-
les, billies, and such other weapons as are usually employed in brawls,
street fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies,
blackguards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the community and the
injury of the state.269
Thus, the Second Amendment guarantees the individual to keep
and bear hand-carried, militia-type arms, including rifles, muskets,
guns, and swords. The court does not state how it arrived at the con-
clusion that pistols were not militia arms. The federal Militia Act of
1792 required every "free able bodied white male citizen" to "provide
himself with a good musket or firelock" or, if a horseman, to keep "a
pair of pistols."27 The term "white" was stricken out in 1867,271
but the Act was otherwise still law when Workman was decided.272
Indeed, pistols, bowie knives, metal knuckles, and billies were all used
during the Civil War,273 and are "arms" which could be used for
personal defense by soldiers, policemen, and citizens.274 In any event,
Workman solidly asserts the right to keep military-type rifles, a type of
arm targeted for prohibition by anti-gun lobbyists in the 1990s.
A massacre of miners in Mingo County touched off West
Virginia's coal wars of 1920-21. The governor's declaration of a state
of war in Mingo County was the subject of Ex parte Lavinder,275
decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court in 1921. The martial law
declaration included "regulations inhibiting the possession and carrying
of arms in the county .... 276 The persons arrested and then peti-
tioning for writs of habeus corpus in that case included a man who
269. Id.
270. 1 STAT. 271 (1792).
271. 14 STAT. 423 (1867).
272. The Militia Act of 1792 was repealed by the Dick Act, 32 STAT. 775 (1903).
273. See, e.g., C. CLARK, GETTYSBURG 148-49 (1985).
274. State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980); State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Or.
1984).
275. Ex parte Lavinder, 108 S.E. 428 (W. Va. 1921).
276. Id. at 429.
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carried a pistol and was licensed to do so, another who carried pistol
cartridges, and a third who passed through a tent colony of striking
coal miners. 77"
The court found that the adjutant general enforced the above rules
though the sheriff, policemen and others instead of, as would have
been proper, the "military force in the state and county, the unorga-
nized militia."278 Far worse, the declaration of martial law was un-
lawful in the first place as "[i]ts sole justification is the failure of the
civil law fully to operate and function for the time being, by reason of
the paralysis or overthrow of its agencies, in consequence of an insur-
rection, invasion, or other enterprise hostile to the state, and resulting
in actual warfare." 279
The court found no state of war and no justification of a declara-
tion of martial law to exist. "Power in a chief magistrate, to effect
such result under ordinary circumstances, would be suggestive of the
,despotism of unrestrained monarchial government .... ,28 0 Finding
the petitioners not to have violated any civil laws, the court ordered
the prisoners discharged.28 l
While the Court vindicated the workers in that case, the lack of
an arms guarantee may have made it easier for one class to manipulate
the state power and to use official police violence against other class-
es. Perhaps having in mind such incidents as the Mingo County Mas-
sacre, in a 1921 decision the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed
the progressive historical character of the right to keep and bear arms,
including the defense of workers from corporate violence:
This is not an idle or an obsolete guaranty, for there are still localities, not
necessary to mention, where great corporations, under the guise of detec-
tive agents or private police, terrorize their employees by armed force. If




280. Id. at 430-31.
281. Id. at 431. See Franks v. Smith, 134 S.W. 484 (Ky. 1911) (upholding damages
against militiamen for arrest of person for carrying concealed weapon, where revolver was
found in carriage and not on the person; military may not supplant the civil power).
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them pistols, they will be completely at the mercy of these great plutocrat-
ic organizations. Should there be a mob, is it possible that law-abiding
citizens could not assemble with their pistols carried openly and protect
their persons and* their property from unlawful violence without going
before an official and obtaining license and giving bond?
22
B. Adoption of the 1986 Guarantee
On November 4, 1986, the people of West Virginia voted 342,963
to 67,168 to add a guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms, ballot
Amendment No. 1, to the West Virginia Constitution. Article 3, Sec-
tion 22 of the Bill of Rights now guarantees: "A person has the right
to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home, and state,
and for lawful hunting and recreational use."
The amendment had a historical counterpart in the 1787 proposal
by the Pennsylvania minority for a guarantee to the United States
Constitution protecting arms use for defense of self and state and for
killing game.8 3 However, its detailed language was calculated to de-
feat a more contemporary problem: the argument that the "people"
who have the right to arms only include the National Guard, not the
people at large. Thus, the guarantee protects "a person," not "the peo-
ple," and self defense, hunting, and recreation take the place of tradi-
tional militia language, thereby also protecting all "arms" used for the
purposes, i.e., rifles, pistols, shotguns, and well as other instruments.
Amendment No. 1 was promoted by the United Sportsmen of
West Virginia2 4 and the National Rifle Association.8 5 A three
page legal memorandum on the proposed amendment, prepared by
282. State v. Kemer, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921) (invalidating requirement that
permit be obtained from sheriff before openly bearing a pistol).
283. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
284. United Sportsmen, a registered political action committee, was chaired by Phillip
L. Bums of Williamstown, president of the West Virginia Rifle and Pistol Association.
United Sportsmen supported voter adoption of the amendment in a coalition including the
West Virginia Wildlife Federation, the West Virginia Trappers' Association, and organiza-
tions of firearm owners.
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Robert Dowlut, an attorney for the National Rifle Association, was
sent by Charles H. Cunningham, NRA's State Liaison, on February 6,
1985, to all thirty-four senators and on March 15, 1985, to all one
hundred delegates.8 6 Supported by dozens of citations to decisions of
courts of other states, the document analyzed each term of the propos-
al. The term "a person" means that the amendment "guarantees an
individual right." However, felons, minors, and the mentally infirm are
not protected.287 "Constitutionally protected arms would include the
rifle, shotgun, and pistol. ' 288 The analysis asks: "What, then, is in-
volved in this right of keeping arms? It necessarily involves the right
to purchase and use them in such a way as is usual, or to keep them




The keeping of bombs, cannon, and poison gas is not protected,
and the concealed carrying of arms, or being armed at a court, church,
or other specified place may be prohibited.29 The purposes for
which arms could be used were explained in part as follows:
The proposed guarantee is a victims' rights measure. It will guarantee that
a person may exercise the choice to have arms to lawfully and effectively
resist violent criminal aggression against self, family, or home ....
During World Was HI... the people served in the militia and used
their personally owned firearms to protect the state ....
The term "lawful" was inserted as a matter of superabundant caution
to indicate that hunting and recreational use may be regulated by law.291
The arms guarantee was introduced as House Joint Resolution No.
18 by Delegates Joe E. Martin, a Democrat from Elkins, and William
F. Carmichael, a Republican from Ripley, on February 21, 1985.292
286. The cover letters are included in City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139
(W. Va. 1988), Appendix to Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association, A4-A5.
287. "Analysis of Proposed West Virginia Constitutional Guarantee to Keep and Bear
Arms," reprinted in James W. McNeely, The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and
Where-West Virginia Firearms Law v. The Right-to-Bear-Arms Amendment, 89 W. VA. L.
REV. 1125, 1176 (1987) [hereinafter McNeely, Right of Who to Bear What].
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1177 (quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1177-78.
292. W. VA. HOUSE J. 216 (Feb. 21, 1985).
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On March 18, '1985, the House Committee on Constitutional Revision
reported and recommended unanimously that H.J. Res. 18 be adopt-
ed. 293
On motion of Delegate James W. McNeely, a Democrat from
Mercer, the guarantee was amended by voice vote two days later, so
that the word "lawful" was placed before "defense of self, family,
home .... One delegate reportedly voted against this amend-
ment because "lh]e's afraid that means unless there are specific laws
authorizing the use of guns for whatever purpose, guns won't be 'le-
gal. 295 The following day, the House rejected the motion of Dele-
gate Thomas Knight, Democrat of Kanahwa, to make the right explicit-
ly subject to the police power of the state,296 a clause that was held
in reference to another state's constitution to authorize a handgun
ban.297 The House then adopted the guarantee by a vote of ninety-
one to seven.298
On April 2, 1985, after passing Senator White's motion to delete
the term "lawful" from the clause "lawful defense of self, family,
home," the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted H.J. Res. 18.299
When the full Senate considered the measure two days later, Charles-
ton Democratic Senator Mario J. Palumbo moved that the guarantee be
amended to read: "Subject only to the police power, a well-regulated
militia being necessary to the security of a free state, a person has the
right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home, and
state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use." 30° Palumbo insert-
ed into the record the following explanation:
293. Id. at 515 (Mar. 18, 1985).
294. Id. at 583-84 (Mar. 20, 1985).
295. Deborah Baker, Amendment Is Pushed Protecting Gun Rights, PARKERSBURG
NEWS, Mar. 25, 1985, at 4.
296. McNeely, Right of Who to Bear What, supra note 287, at 1143 (citing W. Va.
House J. 599-600 (Mar. 21, 1985) and interview with Delegate Knight).
297. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984).
298. W. VA. HOUSE J. 599-600 (Mar. 21, 1985).
299. McNeely, Right of Who to Bear What, supra note 287, at 1144 (citing unpub-
lished committee minutes).
300. W. VA. SENATE J. 910 (April 4, 1985).
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The right of an individual to bear arms should not be superior to the
State's obligation to protect its people under its police power and through
its National Guard forces. In my opinion, House Joint Resolution No. 18
will cast considerable doubt on whether the State's police power and Na-
tional Guard forces will continue to be superior to an individual's right to
bear arms. °"
The amendment was defeated 4 to 29,'02 and the following day the
Senate adopted H.J. Res. 18 by a vote of thirty-two to two.30 3
A conference committee of House and Senate members voted to
adopt the Senate version of H.J. Res. 18. On April 12, 1985, the
House adopted the conference report, and then adopted H.J. Res. 18 by
a vote of ninety-one to six.304 The Senate passed the guarantee again
that day thirty-one to three.05
Upon legislative passage, newspapers published the guarantee's
language and quoted supporters as stating that it would prohibit "gun
bans, such as the one enacted in Morton Grove, Ill."3°6 Delegate
James W. McNeely opposed the guarantee, stating that "[t]he effect
may be anything from cancellation of existing law to depriving citizens
of this state from bearing arms other than for defense or recre-
",307ation.
On October 26, 1986, full page newspaper advertisements exhorted
"PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS VOTE YES ON #1." Placed by United
Sportsmen of West Virginia and the NRA, the notices quoted the lan-
guage of the arms guarantee, advised that it "will protect your right to
own and use firearms," and concluded with a list of supporters, in-
cluding Governor Arch Moore, elected officials, and law enforcement
officials. 308
301. Id. at 2638 (1985).
302. W. VA. SENATE J. 910 (April 4, 1985).
303. Id. at 946-47 (April 5, 1985).
304. W. VA. HOUSE J. 1484-87 (April 12, 1985).
305.. W. VA. SENATE J. 164042 (April 12, 1985).
306. W. Va. Voters To Decide Arms Issue in 1986, THE PARKERSBURG NEWS, Apr.
13, 1985, at 12; Patrick McMahon, Amendment On Guns On Ballot, THE PARKERSBURG
SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 1985, at 12.
307. Id.
308. See CHARLESTON GAZETTE MAIL, Oct. 26, 1986, at 13D; HUNTINGTON HERALD-
1993]
71
Halbrook: Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep Arms: Reflecti
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In another paid political advertisement entitled "Intent of Constitu-
tional Amendment 1," the voters were advised two days before the
election on the scope of the arms guarantee as follows:
* Yes on Amendment #1 guarantees that arms may be kept or carried for
traditional purposes, such as hunting, target shooting, and self-defense. This
includes the right to purchase arms and ammunition and to keep arms in a
state of repair.
* Yes on Amendment #1 means that the individual right to keep and bear
arms for a Constitutionally protected purpose may not be infringed. Thus,
laws banning the possession or sale of Constitutionally protected arms,
laws requiring a license to possess or acquire such arms, requiring the
registration of such arms or imposing special taxation on such arms would
not be permitted.
* Yes on Amendment #1 does not extend to every conceivable weapon or
instrument. Constitutionally protected arms include rifles, shotguns, revolv-
ers, pistols and hunting knives, thus, weapons not commonly kept by the
people, such as instruments of mass destruction such as bombs or rockets,
find no protection under this guarantee.
* Yes on Amendment #1 extends to open carrying of Constitutionally pro-
tected arms. The bearing of arms concealed may be regulated by, for
example, requiring a license to carry arms concealed. However, licensing
would have to be administered with the right to bear arms in mind. Fur-
thermore, the carrying of arms may be restricted in places such as court-
rooms or polling places.
* Yes on Amendment #1 does not protect those who misuse firearms. The
types of misconduct that the state legislature may forbid and punish are
well-known and self-evident. Examples of such misconduct include using
arms to commit robbery, rape, burglary, assault; carrying arms while intox-
icated; using arms to unlawfully harass, intimidate, or recklessly endanger
someone; shooting in an unsafe place or manner; and poaching. Also ex-
cluded from the enjoyment of this right would be convicted felons, mental
incompetents, minors and illegal aliens. That such persons may be exclud-
ed is a well-established principle of law.3°
DISPATCH, Oct. 26, 1986, at A6. The same advertisement also appeared on Oct. 26, 1986,
in the BECKLEY REGISTER/HERALD, BLUEFIELD TELEGRAPH, CLARKSBURG EXPONENT TELE-
GRAM, FAIRMONT TIMES, LOGAN BANNER, MORGANTOWN DOMINION POST, PARKERSBURG
NEWS SENTINEL, and WHEELING INTELLIGENCER. Paid radio announcements in favor of
Amendment No. 1 were broadcast on Charleston radio stations during the week before the
election.
309. On Nov. 2, 1986, the advertisement, which noted that it was paid for by the
United Sportsmen of West Virginia and the NRA, appeared in the BECKLEY REGIS-
TER/HERALD, at 7E; FAIRMONT TIMES, at 8B; HUNTINGTON HERALD-DISPATCH, at B15;
[Vol. 96:1
72
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/4
19931 RATIONING FIREARMS PURCHASES
One editorial commented that the amendment would only clutter
the state constitution, for "with or without this amendment, nobody
will ever be able to take the shotguns and rifles from West Virginia's
hunters or handguns from those folks 'intent' on protecting their
homes and businesses., 310 Another ridiculed Delegate, Joe Martin, in-
troduced the amendment by stating that "the right to keep and bear
arms is a part of the heritage of West Virginia."311 Delegate James
W. McNeely, identified as a law student and the amendment's most
vocal opponent, claimed that it "could have a drastic impact on exist-
ing gun permit laws," and could be used to challenge denying gun
permits to "aliens or convicted felons. 312 One newspaper stated:
McNeely said that the proposal described in the [NRA] advertisements
would change "the present law in connection with the right of people to
openly carry firearms or hunting knives without a permit."
"It opens the right to anybody to carry rifles, shotguns, revolvers,
pistols and hunting knives out in the open without any restraint," he
said. 3
MORGANTOWN DOMINION POST, at 12); and WHEELING NEWS-REGISTER, at 16. On Nov.
2, 1986, the same advertisement also appeared in the BLUEFIELD TELEGRAPH, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE MAIL, CLARKSBURG EXPONENT TELEGRAM, LOGAN BANNER, and PARKERSBURG
NEWS SENTINEL.
310. What's the Point?, THE HUNTINGTON HERALD-DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 1986, at A4.
311. Don Palmerine, An Absurd Amendment, FAIRMONT TIMES, Nov. 1, 1986, at 4,
lambasted the amendment as a "brainless notion," and claimed that it would prevent hand-
gun bans, would increase crime and accidents, and would remind people of a heritage that
should be forgotten. He referred to the National Rifle Association as the National Ridicu-
lous Association "that is probably responsible for more deaths (both accidental and crimi-
nal) by firearms than the criminals," and urged a no vote to show "that you possess more
common sense than the average legislator."
312. Martin Berg, Gun Amendment Seen Having Drastic Effect in State, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1986, at 4A, col. 1. The same appeared in Gun Amendment Could
Affect Permit Law, Delegate Says, HUNTINGTON HERALD-DISPATCH, Oct. 31, 1986, at C10,
col. 1.
Both newspapers quoted Delegate McNeely as claiming that in 1979 the Colorado
Supreme Court struck down, on right-to-bear-arms grounds, a law banning gun permits to
felons. On the contrary, that court upheld the prohibition on possession of firearms by con-
victed felons. People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975).
313. Mercer Delegate Criticizes NRA Ads, Associated Press release published on Nov.
3, 1986 in unidentified newspaper, in Appendix to Brief, supra note 286, at A23.
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The Charleston Gazette published the following balanced exchange
on the proposed amendment:
Effect of Passage: Would authorize the right of a person to keep and
bear arms for defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunt-
ing and recreational use.
Background: The United States Constitution says Congress shall make
no law restricting the ability of the people to keep and bear arms. The
state constitution has no such provision.
Pro--Sen. Larry Tucker, D-Nicholas: "We are one of only 15 or 16
states who have not adopted a measure to make sure that right is guaran-
teed on the state level. The amendment enhances and enforces the (federal)
constitutional right to bear arms. It heads off any attempt by a municipal-
ity to ban handguns, as they did in Elk Grove, Ill."
Con-Sen. Mario Palumbo, D-Kanawha: "The problem with the
amendment is that it may take away the legislative power to regulate
handguns. I think if you give it the literal interpretation it would. Existing
laws covering registration and licensing of pistols could be stricken by the
Supreme Cout.
' 314
On November 4, 1986, the people voted on Amendment No. 1,
which the official ballot's described as follows: "To allow a person to
keep and bear arms for defense of self, family, home, and state and
for recreation." A total of 410,131 votes were cast, with 83.6% voting
in favor and 16.4% opposed.
C. City of Princeton v. Buckner
Defeat at the polls did not deter Delegate McNeely, who proceed-
ed to publish a law review article pontificating on the nature of the
arms guarantee. 31 5 Despite its clear language, he wrote that "a per-
son" only includes a citizen,3 16 "the ight to keep and bear" is actu-
314. Election '86-Proposed State Constitutional Amendments, CHARLESTON GAZETrE,
Oct. 24, 1986 at 5A. At that time, W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 required a license to carry
concealable arms and § 61-7-8 a permit to carry, transport, or possess a high-powered rifle
or machine gun. The sporting and premises exemptions had the effect of excluding rifles
from the permit requirement in most cases.
315. McNeely, Right of Who to Bear What, supra note 287.
316. Id. at 1155.
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ally limited to one's own property or premises,1 7 and the term
"arms" excludes handguns.318 In fact, "arms" only includes "firearms
of a kind and character determined by the state . . . . Handguns . . .
would not be included as constitutionally-protected weapons '. 319
Nonetheless, McNeely also concedes that the amendment protects "a
virtually unlimited right to purchase and possess weapons upon one's
own premises' 32 0-which would preclude a prohibition of the pur-
chase of more than a one gun per month.
McNeely concludes with an exhortation to the judiciary to nullify
the plain language of the amendment:
The lack of formal legislative intent creates a situation in which the judi-
cial branch of the state government must chart the public policy of the
state in weapons regulation. A literal reading of the amendment would cer-
tainly seem at odds with the clear intent of the legislature (although infor-
mally expressed) and the voters.32'
The clearest intent of the legislature and the voters is the actual lan-
guage of the amendment, not some isolated newspaper interview by a
partisan. Instead of protecting constitutional rights, the judiciary is to
be enlisted to destroy them, presumably using sophistry to construe a
right into oblivion.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to swal-
low the bait. State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner322 declared as
unconstitutional the state prohibition on carrying a pistol without a
license. That case involved a person in whose pocket police discovered
a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. The magistrate refused to issue an
arrest warrant, and was sustained by the circuit court, which then
certified the issue to the high court.323
The Court read the 1891 Workman324 precedent as having recog-
317. Id. at 1156.
318. Id. at 1157.
319. Id. at 1159.
320. Id. at 1161.
321. Id. at 1162.
322. 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).
323. ld. at 140-41.
324. State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891). See supra notes 258-69 and accom-
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nized that the right to self-defense is protected by the right to due pro-
cess,32 5 and that the right to keep and bear arms subjects regulations
to the same rigorous scrutiny as would apply to the regulation of a
First Amendment right.326 But the Court rejected Workman's state-
ment that pistols are not constitutionally protected arms:
However, it is important to note that the definition of "arms" presented in
Workman focuses on the "well regulated militia" language of the second
amendment. No parallel language appears in our state constitutional amend-
ment. Because the second amendment does not operate as a restraint upon
the power of states to regulate firearms .... the definition of "arms" set
forth in Workman is not particularly helpful in the case now before us.
Moreover, the broad language embodied in our current Right to Keep and
Bear Arms Amendment makes any further reexamination of the Workman
definition unnecessary.327
The Court referenced seven cases from* other states which voided
proscriptive laws infringing on arms guarantees. 32' The Court added:
panying text.
325. 377 S.E.2d at 142.
326. Id. at 142-43.
327. Id. at 143.
328. Id. at 143. The court's summary is worth quoting, for its approval of a particular
precedent suggests how it might dispose of a similar issue:
See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 23, 501 P.2d 744, 745-46
(1972) (ordinance prohibiting possession of dangerous or deadly weapon unconsti-
tutionally overbroad where it prohibited activities which under police power could
not be reasonably classified as unlawful); In Re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 599, 70 P.
609, 609 (1902) (statute prohibiting carrying of weapons in any manner in cities,
towns or villages was unconstitutional); People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 642,
189 N.W. 927, 929 (1922) (statute prohibiting possession of pistol by
unnaturalized foreign born resident unconstitutional because of broad term "per-
son" in the constitutional provision); State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 403-04, 692
P.2d 610, 614 (1984) (constitutional right to bear arms violated by statute prohib-
iting mere possession and mere carrying of a switchblade knife); State v Blocker,
291 Or. 255, 261-62, 630 P.2d 824, 827 (1981) (statute prohibiting possession of
billy club in public unconstitutional infringement of right to bear arms); State v.
Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 372, 614 P.2d 94, 100 (1980) (statute prohibiting possession
of billy club in home unconstitutional infringement of right to bear arms); State
v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 299, 55 A. 610, 611 (1903) (ordinance prohibiting
carrying dangerous concealed weapon without written permission of mayor or po-
lice chief unconstitutional).
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The language embodied in art. Im § 22 of our State Constitution is sweep-
ing, and we look to the well established rules of constitutional construction
in order to ascertain its meaning.
At the outset we note that the fundamental principle in constitutional
construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the
constitutional amendment and of the people who ratified and adopted
it.329
The Court relied on three further principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion. First, when a constitutional provision "is clear in its terms and of
plain interpretation ... it should be applied and not construed. 330
Second, effect must be given "to every word or phrase within the pro-
vision. 31' Third, a constitutional amendment, as "the latest expres-
sion of the will of the people," supersedes any previous provision or
statute.332 "Because the constitutional provision in the case before us
is clear and unambiguous, this Court must apply the amendment rather
than construe it."' 333 The Court thus held:
W. Va.. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] is written as a total proscription of the carry-
ing of a dangerous or deadly weapon without a license or other authoriza-
tion. W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] thus prohibits the carrying of weapons
for defense of self, family, home and state without a license or statutory
authorization. Article I, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution,
however, guarantees that a person has the right to bear arms for those
defensive purposes. Thus, the statute operates to impermissibly infringe
upon this constitutionally protected right to bear arms for defensive purpos-
es.
334
In support of the above, the Court cited City of Lakewood v.
Pillow,335 in which the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a local
ordinance which purported to ban possession of a firearm except with-
in one's domicile or at a target range, unless licensed by the city.
336
329. Id. at 143 (quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted).




334. Id. at 144.
335. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. 1972) (en banc).
336. Article II, § 13 of the Colorado Constitution states: "The right of no person to
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Finding the ordinance to be "unconstitutionally overbroad," the Court
explained:
An analysis of the foregoing ordinance reveals that it is so general in its
scope that it includes within its prohibitions the right to carry on certain
businesses and to engage in certain activities which cannot under the
police powers be reasonably classified as unlawful and thus, subject to
criminal sanctions. As an example, we note that this ordinance would
prohibit gunsmiths, pawnbrokers and sporting goods stores from carrying
on a substantial part of their business. Also, the ordinance appears to
prohibit individuals from transporting guns to and from such places of
business for the purpose of self-defense. Several of these activities are
constitutionally protected, Colo. Const. art. II, § 13. Depending upon the
circumstances, all of these activities and others may be entirely free of any
criminal culpability yet the ordinance in question effectively includes them
within its prohibitions and is therefore invalid.337
The Colorado Court explained why such restrictions on firearms
are not proper under the police power as follows:
A governmental purpose to control or prevent certain activities, which may
be constitutionally subject to state or municipal regulation under the police
power, may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms . . . . Even though the
governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can-
not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.338
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly stated that commercial
dealings in firearms could not be criminalized, and that only the least
restrictive method of regulation is permissible in relation to a funda-
mental right. Under these principles, a prohibition on purchase of more
than one gun each month would be unconstituitonal.
The West Virginia Court noted that the right to bear arms is not
"absolute" and may be regulated.339 "We stress, however, that the le-
keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons."
337. City of Lakewood, 501 P.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
338. Id.
339. 377 S.E.2d at 145.
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gitimate governmental purpose in regulating the right to bear arms
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this
right where the governmental purpose can be more narrowly
achieved. 34°
The legislature responded to the constitutional mandate by revising
the firearms statutes. It first declared:
The Legislature finds that the overwhelming support of the citizens of
West Virginia for article three, section twenty-two of the Constitution of
this State, commonly known as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Amendment", combined with the obligation of the state to reasonably
regulate the right of persons to keep and bear arms for self-defense re-
quires the reenactment of this article.34'
The open carrying of firearms was no longer a crime, while carry-
ing a concealed weapon without a license, with exceptions for persons
on their own premises and elsewhere, was a misdemeanor.342
The legislature enacted a provision for a state license to carry a
concealed deadly weapon to any citizen meeting specified require-
ments, including "that the applicant desires to carry such deadly weap-
on for a defense of self, family, home or state, or other lawful pur-
pose ... .,343 In Application of Metheney,344 the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that this provision "in no way infringes upon a
citizen's right to keep and bear arms. It merely regulates the manner
in which a citizen may do so ... 345 The same year, in State v.
Daniel,346 the court found that the prohibition on brandishing or oth-
erwise misusing a firearm does not violate the guarantee.347
340. Id. at 146 (citing City of Lakewood, 501 P.2d 744). The court in Buckner repeat-
ed the proposition and citation once more. Id. at 149.
341. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (1992).
342. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3 (1992).
343. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (1992).
344. 391 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1990).
345. Id. at 638.
346. 391 S.E.2d 90, 96-97 (W. Va. 1990).
347. See United States v. Stump, 784 F. Supp. 326, 330 (N.D.W. Va. 1992) (regard-
ing felon whose civil rights were restored).
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VI. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RATIONING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Does a limit on the purchase of handguns to one each month
violate the right to keep arms? An obvious penumbra of that right is
the right to obtain them, and as Tennessee's high court noted when it
invalidated a prohibition on carrying a pistol, "the right to keep arms
necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep them in a
state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition
suitable for such arms, and to keep them in repair." 8
This statement was quoted in the explanation of the West Virginia
guarantee when the latter was debated in the public forum, and should
be persuasive in construing any of the state arms guarantees or the
federal Second Amendment. Moreover, since the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment sought to eradicate restrictions on the purchase and
keeping of firearms by freedmen, a court could find state purchase
prohibitions to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upholding a substantial jury verdict and attorneys' fees under the
federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the right
to bear handguns under a state constitution, Indiana's Supreme Court
held:
Article 1, § 32 of the Indiana Constitution is entitled "Bearing arms" and
provides as follows:
The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves
and the State.
... The right of Indiana citizens to bear arms for their own self-defense
and for the defense of the state is an interest in both liberty and property
which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion .... This interest is one of liberty to the extent that it enables law-
abiding citizens to be free from the threat and danger of violent crime.
There is also a property interest at stake, for example, in protecting one's
valuables when transporting them, as in the case of a businessman who
brings a sum of cash to deposit in his bank across town.349
348. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178 (1871) (emphasis added).
349. Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990).
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At least two courts have, based on state arms guarantees, rejected
absolute product liability claims against handgun manufacturers, indi-
cating that sale and purchase of handguns are constitutionally protect-
ed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held:
We are also concerned that plaintiffs' argument would thwart Illinois'
policy regarding possession of handguns. The right of private citizens in
Illinois to bear arms is protected, at least against all restrictions except
those imposed by the police power, by the Illinois Constitution.35
Similarly, a Georgia appellate court found that the federal Second
Amendment and that state's arms guarantee protected the right to
market handguns to the general public, and that such marketing, in and
of itself, could not give rise to tort liability:
Appellant first contends that "the trial court erred in holding as a matter of
law that handguns are exempt from Georgia's product liability law because
the lack of safety connected with such weapons raises a political,
nonjustifiable question." Her last contention is that the trial court errone-
ously held as a matter of law that the R.G. revolver is not unreasonably
dangerous when marketed to the general public. We disagree on both
points. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, as does Art. I, sec. I, Par. VIII
of the Georgia Constitution 1983, which states that that right "shall not be
infringed, but the General Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the
manner in which arms may be borne."3
Proponents of the criminalization of the purchase of more than
one handgun each month argue that citizens do not "need" to purchase
more. An Indiana appellate court wrote about state determinations that
persons do not "need" to exercise the right to keep and bear handguns
as follows:
We think it clear that our constitution provides our citizenry the right to
bear arms for their self defense ....
In Schubert's case it is clear from the record that the superintendent
decided the application on the basis that the statutory reference to "a prop-
350. Martin v. Harrington, 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984).
351. Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 325 S.E.2d 465, 466-67 (Ga. App. Ct. 1985).
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er reason" vested in him the power and duty to subjectively evaluate an
assignment of "self-defense" as a reason for desiring a license and the
ability to grant or deny the license upon the basis of whether the applicant
"needed" to defend himself.
Such an approach contravenes the essential nature of the constitution-
al guarantee. It would supplant a right with a mere administrative privilege
which might be withheld simply on the basis that such matters as the use
of firearms are better left to the organized military and police forces even
where defense of the individual citizen is involved.352
The court went on to find the ordinary citizen's interest in self-
defense to be a proper reason for bearing arms, and rejected the fol-
lowing "Catch-22":
Any ordinary citizen applying for a license could be "factually" denied a
permit because no one had actually threatened him. Thus, he would have
no "need" to defend himself. Similarly, if threatened, the permit could be
denied on the basis that the official police agencies were capable of han-
dling the matter so that he had no "need" to defend himself.53
The above is particularly relevant because no duty exists by the
police to protect specific persons. "There simply is no constitutional
right to be protected by the state against criminals or madmen. 354
Restrictions on the right of the people to keep and bear arms must be
tailored to have impact only on violent criminals and not to affect
law-abiding citizens.
No principled jurisprudence can justify the criminalization of the
exercise of a constitutional right to once per month or to any other
arbitrarily-selected period. As the institution against which a bill of
rights protects individuals, government cannot determine that the indi-
vidual does not "need" to exercise a right other than when the govern-
ment allows. The power which decides that a person does not need to
purchase more than one handgun each month might as well subjec-
tively determine that a person does not need to purchase more than
one handgun in a year or in a lifetime. Indeed, if the power to decide
when a person "needs" to exercise a constitutional right resides in the
352. Schubert v. De Bard, 398 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Ind. App. 1980).
353. Id. at 1341 n.5.
354. Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983).
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state, the state may determine that one has no need to exercise the
right at all-ever.
The essence of a bill of rights is that the issue of whether a per-
son "needs" to do a protected act is removed from legislative proscrip-
tion. Elevation of an activity to the status of a constitutional right
removes that activity from subjecting a person to imprisonment or
other deprivations of life, liberty, or property. While the criminal law
naturally addresses the abuse of a right, something which is a funda-
mental right once a month must still be a fundamental right every day
of the month.
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